Essays in labor and public economics by Béland, Louis-Philippe

Université de Montréal
Essays in Labor and Public Economics
par
Louis-Philippe Béland
Département de sciences économiques
Faculté des arts et sciences
Thèse présentée a la Faculté des arts et sciences
en vue de l’obtention du grade de Philosophiæ Doctor (Ph.D.)
en sciences économiques
Mars, 2014
c©Louis-Philippe Beland, 2014.
Université de Montréal
Faculté des arts et sciences
Cette thèse intitulée :
Essays in Labor and Public Economics
présentée par :
Louis-Philippe Béland
évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes :
Andriana Bellou, présidente-rapporteure
Baris Kaymak, directeur de recherche
Daniel Parent, co-directeur de recherche
Joshua Lewis, membre du jury
Fabian Lange, examinateur externe
Michael Huberman, représentant du doyen de la FAS
Thèse acceptée le 28 Mars 2014
To my parents, Sylvain and Suzanne and my fiancée, Sandra
iv
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Prof. Baris Kaymak for his time, support, and guidance
throughout my doctoral studies. Baris has always been very generous with
his time and this has made completing this thesis much easier. I am also
very grateful to Prof. Daniel Parent for his time and the valuable advise he
provided on my thesis and for arranging my visit at UC Berkeley. I am also
very grateful to the other members of my committee for their comments and
discussion.
I would also like to thank Prof. David Card his great advices during the
last two years of my Ph.D and allowing me to visit UC Berkeley. I am very
thankful to Prof. Jennifer Hunt for reading my articles very carefully and her
wise comments on how to improve them. I would like to thank my coauthors
Dongwoo Kim (Chapter 2) and Richard Murphy (Chapter 3). I learned a
lot from these collaborations. I thank the Department of Economics at the
University of Montreal, the Centre for Interuniversity Research in Quanti-
tative Economics (CIREQ) and the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral
Studies and the Fonds québécois de la recherche sur la société et la culture
(FQRSC) for financial support. I would like to thank all the doctoral stu-
dents at the University of Montreal, in particular Vincent, Ismael, Juste,
Guy, Max, Walter, Vincent De Paul and Hector. I thoroughly enjoyed all
discussions we have had at the department about economics that have helped
strengthen my knowledge. I would also like to thank all of the professors at
the University of Montreal.
vI conclude this section with particular attention to my family. To my
parents Sylvain and Suzanne for all their support, my brother Guillaume who
I can always ask for advice and finally my lovely fiancée (soon to be wife)
Sandra which has always been so indulgent with me and always supported
the time spent on my computer to work on this thesis.
vi
Résumé
Dans ma thèse, je me sers de modèles de recherche solides pour répondre à
des questions importantes de politique publique.
Mon premier chapitre évalue l’impact causal de l’allégeance partisane
(républicain ou démocrate) des gouverneurs américains sur le marché du tra-
vail. Dans ce chapitre, je combine les élections des gouverneurs avec les don-
nées du March CPS pour les années fiscales 1977 à 2008. En utilisant un mod-
èle de régression par discontinuité, je trouve que les gouverneurs démocrates
sont associés à de plus faibles revenus individuels moyens. Je mets en évi-
dence que cela est entrainée par un changement dans la composition de la
main-d’oeuvre à la suite d’une augmentation de l’emploi des travailleurs à
revenus faibles et moyens. Je trouve que les gouverneurs démocrates provo-
quent une augmentation de l’emploi des noirs et de leurs heures travaillées.
Ces résultats conduisent à une réduction de l’écart salarial entre les tra-
vailleurs noir et blanc.
Mon deuxième chapitre étudie l’impact causal des fusillades qui se pro-
duisent dans les écoles secondaires américaines sur les performances des éléves
et les résultats des écoles tels que les effectifs et le nombre d’enseignants
recruté, a l’aide d’une stratégie de différence-en-différence. Le chapitre est
coécrit avec Dongwoo Kim. Nous constatons que les fusillades dans les écoles
réduisent significativement l’effectif des élèves de 9e année, la proportion
d’élèves ayant un niveau adéquat en anglais et en mathématiques. Nous ex-
aminons aussi l’effet hétérogene des tueries dans les écoles secondaires entre
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les crimes et les suicides. Nous trouvons que les fusillades de natures crim-
inelles provoquent la diminution du nombre d’inscriptions et de la proportion
d’élèves adéquats en anglais et mathématiques. En utilisant des données sur
les élèves en Californie, nous confirmons qu’une partie de l’effet sur la perfor-
mance des élèves provient des étudiants inscrits et ce n’est pas uniquement
un effet de composition.
Mon troisième chapitre étudie l’impact des cellulaires sur la performance
scolaire des élèves. Le chapitre est coécrit avec Richard Murphy. Dans
ce chapitre, nous combinons une base de données unique contenant les poli-
tiques de téléphonie mobile des écoles obtenues à partir d’une enquète auprès
des écoles dans quatre villes en Angleterre avec des données administra-
tives sur la performance scolaire des éleves. Nous étudions ainsi l’impact
de l’introduction d’une interdiction de téléphonie mobile sur le rendement
des éleves. Nos résultats indiquent qu’il y a une augmentation du rende-
ment des éleves après l’instauration de l’interdiction des cellulaires à l’école,
ce qui suggère que les téléphones mobiles sont sources de distraction pour
l’apprentissage et l’introduction d’une interdiction à l’école limite ce prob-
lème.
Mots-clés : Partis Politiques, Marché du travail, écart salarial entre blancs
et noirs, Tueries, éducation, Performance scolaire, Cellulaires, Technologies,
Régression discontinuité, Différence-en-différence.
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Abstract
In my thesis, I use compelling research designs to address important public
policy issues.
My first chapter estimates the causal impact of the party allegiance (Re-
publican or Democratic) of U.S. governors on labor market outcomes. I
match gubernatorial elections with March CPS data for income years 1977
to 2008. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that Democratic
governors are associated with lower average individual earnings. I provide
evidence that this is driven by a change in workforce composition following
an expansion in employment of workers with low and medium earnings. I
also find that Democratic governors cause a reduction in the racial earnings
gap between black and white workers through an increase in the annual hours
worked by blacks relative to whites.
My second chapter analyze how shootings in high schools affect schools
and students using data from shooting databases, school report cards, and
the Common Core of Data. The chapter is co-written with Dongwoo Kim.
We examine schools’ test scores, enrollment, and number of teachers, as well
as graduation, attendance, and suspension rates at schools that experienced
a shooting, employing a difference-in-differences strategy that uses other high
schools in the same district as the comparison group. Our findings suggest
that homicidal shootings significantly decrease the enrollment of students in
Grade 9, and reduce test scores in math and English. We find no statistically
significant effect for suicidal shootings on any outcome variables of interest.
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Using student-level data from California, we confirm that some of the effects
on student performance occur as a result of students remaining enrolled and
not only due to changes in student body composition.
My third chapter investigates the impact of school mobile phone policy on
student performance. The chapter is co-written with Richard Murphy. Com-
bining a unique dataset on autonomous mobile phone policies from a survey
of schools in four cities in England with administrative data, we investigate
the impact of imposing a mobile phone ban on student performance. Our
results indicate an improvement in student results after a school bans the
use of mobile phones; this suggests that mobile phones distract learning and
imposing a ban limits this problem.
Keywords : Political parties, labor market outcomes, black-white wage
gap, shootings, education, academic performance, mobile phones, technolo-
gies, regression discontinuity, difference-in-differences.
Coauthors contribution: I am the lead author of all chapters in this
thesis. Chapter 2 is co-written with Dongwoo Kim and Chapter 3 is co-
written with Richard Murphy.
Contents
Dedication iii
Acknowledgements iv
Résumé vi
Abstract viii
Table of Contents xii
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xvi
General Introduction 1
1 Political Parties and Labor Market Outcomes. Evidence
from U.S. States. 4
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Power and Role of Governors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4.2 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
x
xi
1.4.3 Graphical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.6 Validity and Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.6.1 Validity of the RD Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.6.2 Possible Heterogeneity of Party Allegiance and Possi-
ble Confounding Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.7 Workforce Changes, Channels and Policies . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.7.1 Impact on Labor Force Composition . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.7.2 Including the Share of Low- and Medium-Earnings Work-
ers in the Earnings Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.7.3 Policies and Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2 The Effect of High School Shootings on Schools and Student
Performance 36
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.2 Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.6 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3 Ill Communication: Mobile Phones & Student Performance 66
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2 Mobile Phones in England . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3 Data and survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3.1 Mobile phone policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3.2 Student Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4.1 School-level data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
xii
3.4.2 Student-level data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5.1 School-level data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5.2 Student-level data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.6 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
General Conclusion 98
Appendix 111
xiii
List of Figures
1.1 Margin of Democratic victory and the proportion of whites
(left) and blacks (right) who work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.2 Margin of Democratic victory and total hours worked per year
for whites (left) and blacks (right) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.3 Margin of Democratic victory and the logarithm of white and
black annual earnings gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.1 Number of Shootings By Type of Shooting . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2 The Effect of Shootings on Grade 9 Enrollment (Entrance Grade) 53
2.3 The Effect of Shootings on math Proficiency Rate . . . . . . . 54
2.4 The Effect of Shootings on English Proficiency Rate . . . . . . 55
2.5 Distribution of t-values from Randomization for Enrollment
in Grade 9, English, and Math . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.6 Distribution of Coefficients from Randomization for Enroll-
ment in grade 9, English, and math. Verticical line represents
estimates from our main specification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.1 Mobile Phones Take-up Rates in England . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.2 KS4 density pre and post ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.3 Event study graph for student proficiency and mobile ban . . 79
List of Tables
1.1 Descriptive statistics of selected variables for states close to
discontinuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.2 RD for hours worked, weeks worked and usual hours . . . . . . 28
1.3 RD for being in labor force and employed . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.4 RD for Earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5 Propensity of being a low-, medium- or high-earnings worker . 31
1.6 Coefficient estimates for number of workers in each category . 32
1.7 RD for probability of being in labor force and employed . . . . 33
1.8 RD for annual, weekly and hourly earnings including share of
workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.9 Summary table of policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.1 Summary Statistics - High Schools before a shooting . . . . . 57
2.2 The Effect of Homicidal Shootings on Enrollment . . . . . . . 58
2.3 The Effect of Homicidal Shootings on Test Results and Be-
havioral Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4 The Effect of Suicidal Shootings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.5 The Effect of Shootings using California Student Level Data -
2007-2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.6 The Effect of Shootings on Cumulative Level of Achievement 62
2.7 The Effect of Shootings by Gender using Student-Level Data . 63
2.8 The Effect of Shootings on enrollment for future years . . . . . 64
xiv
xv
2.9 The Effect of Homicidal Shootings on Test Results - Matching
Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.1 Descriptive statistics on Mobile Phone policies in effect per
year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.2 Descriptive statistics on key variables Pre and Post policy . . 81
3.3 The Effect of Mobile Phone ban on school performance - using
UK School Performance Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.4 The Effect of Mobile Phone ban on school performance by ban
efficiency - using UK School Performance Table . . . . . . . . 83
3.5 The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance - Using
the NPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.6 The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance by ban
efficiency - Using the NPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.7 The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance by student
characteristics - Using the NPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.8 The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance with preachieve-
ment group - Using the NPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.9 Descriptive statistics for key variables for schools in sample
and not in sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.10 Balancing test- Using the NPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.11 The Effect of Mobile Phone ban assessment on student per-
formance after 2005 - using UK School Performance Table . . 90
3.12 The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance - Using
the NPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.13 The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance with preachieve-
ment group - Using the NPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.14 The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance - Using
the NPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.15 The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance by student
characteristics - Using the NPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
xvi
3.16 The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance with preachieve-
ment group - Using the NPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.17 The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance GCSE-
EM - Using the NPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.18 The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance at age 14
- Using the NPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
1General Introduction
Each chapter of this dissertation was written as a separate paper capable of
standing on its own as a piece of publishable research. The structure of this
dissertation thus includes each of my three papers in unique, self-contained
chapters, numbered 1, 2, and 3, respectively. I am fascinated by how policies
and policymakers can influence citizens, particularly in the labor market
and at school. In this thesis, I am answering three policy-relevant questions
using solid research design. Chapter 1 is entitled "Political Parties and Labor
Market Outcomes. Evidence from U.S. States". Chapter 2 is entitled "The
Effect of High School Shootings on Schools and Student Performance" (with
Dongwoo Kim). Chapter 3 is entitled "Ill Communication: Mobile Phones
and Student Performance"(with Richard Murphy).
Chapter 1 studies the impact of Partisan allegiance of politicians on labor
market outcomes. Politicians and political parties play a crucial role in the
economy. A common perception is that Democrats favor pro-labor policies,
and are more averse to income inequality than Republicans. Chapter 1 evalu-
ates the veracity of such claims at the U.S. state level by estimating the causal
impact of the partisan identity of U.S. governors (Republican vs Democratic)
on several labor market outcomes. Using a regression discontinuity design, I
find that Democratic governors are associated with lower average individual
earnings. I provide evidence that this is driven by a change in workforce com-
position following an expansion in the employment of workers with low and
medium earnings. I also find that Democratic governors cause a reduction in
2the racial earnings gap between black and white workers through an increase
in the annual hours worked by blacks relative to whites. I then explore poli-
cies that might explain the results. I find that an increase in public sector
employment, an increase in employment in the health and education sectors,
a higher state Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a (slightly) higher mini-
mum wage, a lower incarceration rate and an impact on worker displacement
under Democratic governors contribute to the increase in the employment
of low- and medium-earning workers and the increase in blacks’ employment
and hours worked.
Chapter 2 explores the impact of school violence on student performance.
In this article with Dongwoo Kim, I analyze how shootings in high schools
affect schools and students using data from shooting databases, school re-
port cards, and the Common Core of Data. Our paper aims to improve the
understanding of how extreme violence in schools affects enrollment, student
performance, the number of teachers in a school, and student behavior, based
on a sample of deadly shootings that occurred between 1994 and 2009. We
examine schools’ test scores, enrollment, and number of teachers, as well
as graduation, attendance, and suspension rates at schools that experienced
a shooting. We employ a differences-in-differences strategy that uses other
high schools in the same district as the comparison group. We address three
questions related to the consequences of homicidal and suicidal high school
shootings. First, we address whether enrollment patterns change after the
shootings, which could be a result of school selection by students and parents
or students dropping out of the school system. Second, we examine whether
deadly shootings cause longer-term trauma that lowers test scores in the
school up to three years after the incident. Third, we look at behavioral vari-
ables and study how they are affected. Our findings suggest that homicidal
shootings significantly decrease the enrollment of students in grade 9, and
test scores in math and English. We find no statistically significant effect for
suicidal shootings on all outcome variables of interest. Using student-level
3data from California, we confirm that part of the effect on student perfor-
mance operates through students remaining enrolled and not only through a
composition effect.
Chapter 3, written with Richard Murphy, investigates if mobile phones
have a negative impact on student performance when allowed on school
grounds and in classrooms. Mobile phones are a big part of teenagers’ social
lives. Mobiles phones are very popular in England, 94% of adults owned a
mobile phone in 2012 and 90.3% of teenagers. In this chapter, we examine if
they might cause distractions at school and lower test scores. Mobile phones
might be distracting to a classroom in many ways. Teachers usually need to
work very hard to keep students’ attention. With mobile phones, students
have access to chat applications, text messaging, the Internet and games and
can go on Facebook and Twitter when teachers are trying to teach. Texting
is also seen as today’s version of passing notes in class but is much more
frequent. Using a unique data set on mobile phone policies that we obtained
by surveying schools in four cities in the England (London, Manchester,
Birmingham and Leicester) along with administrative data, we explore the
impact on student performance of imposing a mobile phone ban at school.
Our results suggest that introducing a ban leads to improvement in student
performance and that mobile phones cause distractions from learning.
4Chapter 1
Political Parties and Labor
Market Outcomes. Evidence from
U.S. States.
Author: Louis-Philippe Béland
1.1 Introduction
Politicians and political parties play a crucial role in the U.S. economy. The
common perception is that Democrats favor pro-labor policies, and are more
averse to income inequality than Republicans. This paper evaluates the
veracity of such claims at the U.S. state level by estimating the causal impact
of the party affiliation of U.S. governors (Republican vs. Democratic) on
several labor market outcomes.
Recent work provides evidence that political allegiance plays a role in
determining politicians’ policy choices and voting behavior at the state level
of government in the U.S. Besley and Case (1995) find that Democratic gov-
ernors are more likely to raise taxes, while Republican governors are less
likely to increase the minimum wage. They also find that the joint election
5of Democrats in the state upper and lower houses and in the governor’s of-
fice has a significant impact on total tax revenues, total spending, family
assistance and workers’ compensation (Besley and Case, 2003). Building on
this, Reed (2006) finds that tax burdens are higher when Democrats con-
trol the state legislature than when Republicans have control, and that the
political party of the governor has little effect on tax burdens, after control-
ling for partisan influences in the state legislature. Lee, Moretti, and Butler
(2004) exploit the random variation associated with close U.S. congressional
elections in a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to show that party affili-
ation explains a very large proportion of the variation in congressional voting
behavior. Leigh (2008) studies numerous policies and outcomes under Demo-
cratic and Republican governors in U.S. states from 1941 to 2002. He finds
that Democratic governors tend to preside over lower after-tax inequality,
implement a higher minimum wage and oversee a lower incarceration rate.
This paper adds to the literature by studying the impact of gubernato-
rial party affiliation on labor market outcomes. It also examines the specific
policies through which party affiliation may affect labor market outcomes.
I match data from gubernatorial elections with data from the Current Pop-
ulation Survey’s (CPS’s) March supplements from 1977 to 2008. I use an
RDD to estimate causal effects by comparing labor market outcomes when a
Democrat barely wins with labor market outcomes when a Democrat barely
loses an election.
This paper’s contribution to the literature is threefold. First, this paper
studies the causal impact of gubernatorial party affiliation on labor market
outcomes, namely earnings, hours worked, weeks worked, employment and
labor force participation. Second, it sheds light on whether the party af-
filiation of governors has an impact on different type of workers, especially
with regard to white and black workers. There is an important and well-
documented earnings gap between black and white workers (eg. Card and
Krueger (1993) and Bjerk (2007)) and this paper investigates whether the
6party affiliation of governors might affect this gap as a large fraction of black
workers vote for Democrats. Third, it makes a link between the results and
some of the policies that were implemented.
The results show that Democratic governors are associated with lower
individual earnings for workers. I provide evidence that this is driven by a
change in the workforce composition via an expansion in the employment
of workers with low and medium earnings. The results also indicate that
blacks are more likely to work and to participate in the labor market under
Democratic governors. There is an increase in the annual hours worked of
blacks relative to whites and a decrease in the earnings gap between blacks
and whites when there is a Democratic governor. I find that an increase in
public sector employment, an increase in employment in the health and edu-
cation sectors, a higher state Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a (slightly)
higher minimum wage, a lower incarceration rate and an impact on worker
displacement under Democratic governors contribute to the increase in the
employment of low- and medium-earning workers and the increase in blacks’
employment and hours worked.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the
powers and role of governors, Section III presents the methodology used,
Section IV provides a description of data and descriptive statistics, Section
V presents the main results, Section VI discusses the validity of the RDD
and presents some robustness checks, and Section VII discusses mechanisms
and policies that may explain the results.
1.2 Power and Role of Governors
The U.S. political system allows states to exercise a high degree of autonomy.
States can levy taxes, establish license fees, spend tax revenues, regulate
1Worker displacement is studied using the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS). The dis-
placed workers are defined similarly to Neal (1995) and the empirical strategy is described
below.
7businesses and manage the health care system and emergency services. The
governor heads the executive branch in each state. The governor sets policies,
prepares and administers a budget, recommends legislation, signs laws and
appoints department heads. In some states, the governor has additional roles
such as commander-in-chief of the National Guard and has partial or absolute
power to commute or pardon criminal sentences. Governors can veto state
bills, which gives them considerable control over policies.2 In all but seven
states, governors have the power to use a line-item veto on appropriation
bills. This gives the governor the authority to delete part of a bill passed by
the legislature that involves taxing or spending. All U.S. governors now serve
for four-year terms, except in New Hampshire and Vermont, which have two-
year terms. Gubernatorial elections are held in November and the governor
takes office the following January. Election years differ from state to state.
1.3 Methodology
My identification strategy is an RDD to account for the potential endo-
geneity of election outcomes. It follows the work of Lee (2001, 2008) and
Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), and is used in papers such as Lee, Moretti, and
Butler (2004), Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009,
2012). Endogeneity concerns surrounding election outcomes come from fac-
tors such as labor market conditions, voter characteristics, the quality of
candidates, which party is incumbent, the resources available for campaigns,
and other unmeasured characteristics of states and candidates that would
bias the estimates of the impact of the party allegiance of governors. These
factors can influence who wins the election. Lee (2001, 2008) demonstrates
that looking at close electoral races provides quasi-random variation in win-
ners and allows for the identification of causal effects.
2A governor’s veto can be overruled by the legislature by a simple, two-thirds or three-
fifths majority, depending on the state.
8An RDD also allows for the estimation of the local average treatment
effect in a case where randomization is infeasible. It can be done using
either parametric or non-parametric estimation. My main specification uses
a parametric approach, which allows for straightforward hypothesis testing.3
The discontinuity is defined where the margin of victory is 0%. Positive
values indicate that a Democratic governor was elected while negative values
indicate that a Republican won.
Specification 1: Main Regression
Yist = β0 + β1Dst + β2Dst × Blackist + β3Blackist
+β4Xist + β5Zist + F (MVst) (1.1)
+Fb(MVst)× Blackist
My coefficients of interest are β1 and β2. Yist represents the labor market
outcome of interest for individual i in state s in year t. I consider the fol-
lowing labor market outcomes (conditional on having positive earnings and
wages): annual earnings, weekly earnings and hourly wages. I also look at
labor force participation and employment, as well as (conditional on work-
ing): total hours worked per year, usual hours worked per week and weeks
worked per year. All earning and wages variables are in real terms, and I
use the logarithm for earnings, hours and weeks worked regressions. Blackist
represents a dummy for the worker being black. Dst is a dummy variable
that takes on a value of one if a Democratic governor is in power in state s
during year t. MVst refers to the margin of victory in the last gubernatorial
election at year t in state s. For example, the 1978 election results (the po-
litical party of the winner and the margin of victory) in California are used
in employment regressions for 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982. The margin of
victory is defined as the proportion of votes cast for the winner minus the
3My specification is similar to that of Ferreira and Gyourko (2009, 2012), which also
uses a parametric approach and third-order polynomial. In the robustness section, I discuss
regressions with other polynomial degrees and local-linear regressions.
9proportion of votes cast for the candidate who finished second. The value
is positive if the Democratic candidate won and negative if he or she lost.4
The pure party effect, β1, is estimated controlling for the margin of victory
using a third-order polynomial F (MVst). Xist refers to individual character-
istics and includes variables such as dummies for the education level, marital
status, age and gender. Zst includes state fixed effects and year fixed effects.
Fb(MVst)×Blackist allows for a different trend for black workers. Standard
errors are clustered at the state-term level.5 I focus on blacks and whites
aged 20 to 55.6
1.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
1.4.1 Data
Data are drawn from various sources.
For gubernatorial elections, two main data sources are used. For elections
data prior to 1990, I use the ICPSR 7757 (1995) files called “Candidate and
Constituency Statistics of Elections in the United States, 1788-1990.” Data
post-1990 comes from the Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011).7 Only
elections where either a Democrat or a Republican won are included.8 All
states are included. Variables of interests taken from these sources are the
4I exclude observations where neither a Democrat nor Republican won.
5Results are robust to alternative clustering. One potential concern is serial correlation;
as such, I present clustering at the state level in the appendix. I also present clustering at
the state-year level.
6Results are robust to using different age groups (for example 18 to 64). I am focusing
on prime working age worker in the paper. The results hold if I include other race in the
sample and replace the black dummy with a non-white dummy.
7Data were double-checked using official sources (such as state legislature websites and
Council of State Governments data) wherever possible.
8There are a few cases where there is special appointment within a term and there is
a change of governor (for example, if a governor dies). I include observations where the
new governor is from the same party. However, if the special appointment within a term
changes the party in power, I drop these observations from my regressions because I do
not have the relevant margin of victory.
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party of the winner and the margin of victory.
The March Current Population Survey (CPS) provides a large sample
size of workers and individual characteristics such as age, education, race and
marital status. I use data from 1978 to 2009, which represents income years
1977 to 2008.9 The state identifier available after 1977 in CPS data allows
for the matching of gubernatorial election data to the CPS. For robustness, I
use the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) data from 1979 to
2008 for the following outcomes variables: being employed and hours worked
last week.
Some additional state characteristics are added for some robustness spec-
ifications. State senate elections, state house elections are taken from Uni-
versity of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR) (2011) for 1980
to 2010, and data from Leigh (2008) for 1977 to 1980.
1.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
In the 1,566 year × state observations in my sample, Republicans governed
730 times, compared to 836 times for Democrats. Democrats were more
often in office in earlier years (486 observations for Democratic governors
versus 300 for Republicans from 1977 to 1992), while Republicans were more
often in office in recent years (430 observations for Republicans versus 350
for Democrats between 1993 and 2008).10
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics for states in years where the elec-
tion results are close, that is when the margin of victory is within 5 or
10 percentage points. There are 346 year × state observations within a
five-percentage-point margin of victory (163 observations for Democrat win-
ners and 183 for Republicans), while there are 678 observations within a
9To circumvent the top coding of the income variables in the CPS, I replace the top-
coded income variables with consistent mean-cell data estimated by Larimore et al. (2008)
10As mentioned above, I exclude from my sample cases when an independent governor
won or when the party in office changes during the term.
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10-percentage-point margin of victory, with Democratic governors in power
339 times.
Table 1.1 indicates that states close to the threshold are similar along
a number of dimensions: the proportion of blacks in the population; the
proportion of the population less than 15 years old; the proportion of the
population older than 65; the proportion of the population between 20 and
55; the proportion of the population for whom the highest level of education
completed is elementary school; the proportion of the population for whom
the highest level of education is some high school education, high school
diploma or some college; the proportion of the population for whom the
highest level of study is having a college degree or more; and the logarithm of
the population of the state. This suggests that the key underlying assumption
of the RDD estimates, which is that states where a Democratic governor
barely won should be similar to states where a Republican barely won, is
satisfied. I later use these variables as dependent variables when I examine
the robustness of the results.
1.4.3 Graphical Evidence
Figures 1, 2 and 3 explore the discontinuity at 0% when a Democratic gover-
nor barely wins over a Republican by margin of victory. Figure 1 presents the
proportion of whites and blacks employed and Figure 2 presents the hours
worked by white and black workers. Figure 3 shows the earnings gap between
whites and blacks. Appendix A presents figures for differential impacts by
standard covariates: gender, education and age.
Each dot in the panel corresponds to the average outcome that follows
election t, grouped by margin of victory intervals. The solid lines in the
figures represent the predicted values from the cubic polynomial fit without
covariates. The horizontal axis is the margin of victory in percentage points,
and the vertical axis is the outcome of interest. Figures 1 and 2 suggest that
there is a higher proportion of blacks who work under Democratic governors
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and that they work more hours. Figure 3 suggests a decrease in the black-
white earnings gap, following the increase in blacks’ employment and hours.
I estimate these effects precisely in the next section, using controls listed
above to isolate the effect of party allegiance of governors on labor market
outcomes.
1.5 Main Results
Tables 2, 3, and 4 present coefficients from the estimation of the main spec-
ification (1) for the variables Democratic governor, Democratic governor ×
black, and black, respectively. Democratic governor and Democratic gov-
ernor × black are the variables of interest. Column 1 presents results for
all black and white men and women, and columns 2 and 3 present results
for men and women separately. Where I note that results are statistically
significant, I mean that they are significant at the 5% level, unless otherwise
specified.
Table 1.2 presents results for the following dependent variables: total
hours worked per year, weeks worked per year and usual hours per week.
Table 1.2 shows how much more or less an average individual works when
a Democrat is in office, conditional on that individual working. Democratic
governors do not have a significant impact on the intensive margin for whites
(except for usual hours worked for men, statistically significant at the 10%
level). However, there is an increase in blacks’ hours worked relative to
whites under a Democratic governor. On average, black men increase their
hours worked per year (4.47%) and hours worked per week (1.76%) relative
to white men under Democratic governors. They also increase their weeks
worked (2.71%) (statistically significant at the 10% level). Results for black
women are less pronounced. Only their weeks worked per year statistically
significantly increase relative to white women under a Democratic governor
(2.68%) (statistically significant at the 10% level).
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Table 1.3 presents results when the dependent variables measure labor
force participation and employment. The coefficients for β1, β2 and β3 of
specification (1) are estimated using a linear probability model. Table 1.3
shows that the political party of the governor has an impact on black labor
force participation and employment, especially for women. Democratic gov-
ernors have a statistically significant impact on labor force participation and
the likelihood of black women being employed (3.65% and 3.82%, respec-
tively). The corresponding coefficients for men are positive but not signifi-
cant. There is no statistically significant effect of Democratic governors on
employment for whites overall, or for white men or women.
Table 1.4 presents results when the dependent variables are real annual
earnings, real weekly earnings and real hourly wages. The results indicate
that under a Democratic regime, annual earnings, weekly earnings and hourly
earnings are lower on average for whites, and that this decrease is larger for
men than for women. The estimates for men, which are −3.00% for annual
earnings, −2.49% for weekly earnings and −1.87% for hourly wages, are
statistically significant for all measures of earnings and wages. The estimates
for females are −1.44% for annual earnings, −1.78% for weekly earnings,
and −1.51% for hourly wages (only weekly earnings and hourly wages are
statistically significant at the 10% level). Table A.1 in Appendix A presents
RD estimates for outcomes using whites and blacks combined. It shows that
there is an overall decrease in average annual earnings, especially for men.
Table 1.4 also provides evidence that party affiliation plays a role in the
black and white earnings gap. Democratic governors have a positive impact
on the relative earnings of blacks. The impact is 5.88% for men and 5.03% for
men and women combined. Both of these effects are statistically significant.
The coefficient for women is positive, but not statistically significant. The
Democratic governor × black interactions are positive but not significant for
weekly earnings and hourly wages.
Tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 present results for blacks relative to whites, which
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is my main focus. Table A.2 in Appendix A presents the total effect for
blacks (β1 + β2) for all regressions of Tables 2, 3 and 4. It shows than un-
der Democratic governors, there is a statistically significant increase in total
hours, weeks worked and employment for blacks. There is no statistically
significant effect on earnings.
1.6 Validity and Robustness Checks
I perform a number of robustness checks to ensure that my results are robust.
1.6.1 Validity of the RD Design
I begin my robustness checks by investigating the key assumption of the RDD
approach, which is that states where a Democratic governor barely wins a
gubernatorial election are similar to states where a Republican barely wins.
I verify and confirm that states close to the discontinuity are similar along a
number of dimensions. As in Ferreira and Gyourko (2009), I estimate regres-
sion discontinuity specifications using variables for state characteristics as
dependent variables. I use aggregate data and an aggregate version of speci-
fication (1) without the individual characteristics. I find that the coefficient
associated with a Democratic governor is never significant for these outcome
variables, which indicates that states are not statistically significantly differ-
ent near the discontinuity.11
To address the issues raised in Caughey and Sekhon (2011) about the
11The RDD coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) for a Democratic governor
are: proportion of the population that is black [0.153 (0.286)], proportion of the population
for whom the highest level of schooling is elementary education [-0.318 (0.452)], proportion
of the population for whom the highest level of schooling is some high school, a high
school diploma or some college [0.767 (0.506)], proportion of the population with a college
degree or more [-0.450 (0.429)], proportion of the population less than 15 years old [-
0.009 (0.321)], proportion of the population over 65 [0.0477 (0.222)], proportion of the
population between 20 to 55 [-0.005 (0.351)], and a logarithm of state population [-1.647
(2.833)]. The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100.
15
RD design in the case of an election, I also verify that situations where
Democrats barely win and situations where Democrats barely lose do not
differ significantly in pre-treatment covariates. I create a variable which is
equal to 1 if the governor at T-1 was from a different party and 0 otherwise
and I check for the balance of this covariate. I find no discontinuity in that
variable, which is evidence that close elections are not predictable and can be
interpreted as random. I also use data on campaign spending from Jensen and
Beyle (2003) to check whether this covariate is balanced.12 This is indeed the
case. As to whether close gubernatorial elections can be regarded as random,
it may be that close elections won by Democratic governors are more likely
to also come with a Democratic house or senate. I check and confirm that
the variable indicating who controls the house and who controls the senate
are balanced. I also check whether there is a discontinuity in the density
of the forcing variable at the threshold. It is important to verify that the
number of Democratic governors and Republican governors is similar around
the threshold, which is the case here. These results are reported in Appendix
B.
A second identification issue concerns the persistence of the outcome vari-
ables. It could be that Democratic governors are more likely to be elected
(even in close elections) in state-years with relative lower earnings or employ-
ment. Even with fixed effects, labor market trends could be state-specific.
To address this concern, I do a “placebo” test. I take the outcome variables
of interest in T-1 as covariates, and check for balance between the control
and treatment group. I find that there is no discontinuity in T-1. Results
are shown in Appendix B. I also present graphs at T-1, T+1, and T+1 and
T+2 together for employment rates of white and black workers separately.
These results are reported in Appendix C. As can be seen from the figures,
12The codebook explaining how Jensen and Beyle (2003) created the variables is avail-
able at http://www.unc.edu/∼beyle/guber.html. Since the information available differs
from state to state and year to year, I use the share of Democratic spending as the outcome
variable.
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there is no discontinuity at T-1 in employment for blacks and whites, and
the impact of political parties is mostly felt after one year for blacks.
1.6.2 Possible Heterogeneity of Party Allegiance and
Possible Confounding Factors
In Appendix D, I explore how results are robust to different specifications
for one of the outcome variables: total hours worked last year. Results
and conclusions are robust to using a 1st-, 2nd-, or 4th-order polynomial.
Results for the local-linear specifications using grouped data by state and
year are available in Appendix D for different bandwidths, including the
optimal bandwidth procedures of Calonico et al. (2012) and Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). I also present weighted and unweighted estimates
from the grouped data regression to explore how sensitive the results are to
weighting. Overall, the results are very robust across different specifications.
I also estimate main specification (using as the outcome variable the num-
ber of total hours worked) for different samples of years and states, and find
that while the coefficients vary slightly depending on years and states used,
the main effects, their significance and the conclusions remain valid. One in-
teresting subsample is non-southern states.13 Democrats in the south are ar-
guably more conservative and therefore more similar to Republicans (Alt and
Lowry, 2000). Therefore, one might expect that the effects of a Democratic
governor relative to a Republican would be more marked in non-southern
states. I find that for non-southern states, the positive impact of a Demo-
cratic governor on total hours for black workers is more pronounced. As
another robustness check, I restricted the sample to states that frequently
elect both Democrats and Republicans (as opposed to states that consis-
13The Census classified states as either Northeastern, Midwestern, Southern or West-
ern. The southern states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia and West Virginia.
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tently elect a governor from a single party).14 The results and conclusions
are robust to focusing on these states only.
I also replicate the results using a new database. Using the CPS Merged
Outgoing Rotation Groups, I replicate the results for the employment and
hours outcomes in the reference weeks using specification (1). Results for
those replications are available in Appendix E and are quite similar to the
March CPS results.
Another test is to include more state- and time-varying characteristics
to better isolate the impact of the gubernatorial election. The objective is
to control for possible confounding factors that might influence the results.
The results are robust to the addition of controls for the population, the
proportion of the population that is black, the proportion of population with
a college diploma, the proportion of the population with a graduate degree,
and proportion of the population that did not complete high school. The
results are also robust to the inclusion of dummies for the governor being
a woman or from a minority ethnic group. The results are robust to the
inclusion of a dummy variable for having Democrats control the state senate,
a dummy variable for Democrats controlling the state house and a dummy
variable for the governor being a Democrat during the last term. The results
are also robust to including region × time dummies for the following regions
(as defined by the Census Bureau): Northeast, Midwest, South and West.
Finally, the results are qualitatively the same if I exclude the first year that
a governor is in power, to remove potential lags in policy.
Overall, results are very robust to alternative specifications and a rich
set of time-varying state characteristics. These numerous robustness checks
provides confidence that there is a causal role played by party allegiance at
the gubernatorial level on labor market outcomes.
14This subsample includes the states where Democrats and Republicans were each in
office at least 30% of the time during my sample period.
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1.7 Workforce Changes, Channels and Policies
This paper has established that, on average, Democratic governors have dif-
ferent effects on the labor market than Republicans. When Democratic gov-
ernors are in office, the following three effects take place: a decrease in average
earnings for whites, an increase in employment and hours worked for blacks,
and a decrease in the earnings gap between white and black workers.
In this section, I examine the mechanisms through which governors ex-
ercise their influence over the labor market. I provide evidence that un-
der Democratic governors, there is an increase of low- and medium-earnings
workers and that this change in workforce composition is a main factor ex-
plaining the decrease in earnings. I then review potential policies through
which the increase in low- and medium- earnings workers and the increase in
the employment of blacks takes place.
1.7.1 Impact on Labor Force Composition
To study the impact of party allegiance on workforce composition, I first
divide workers into three categories: low-, medium- and high-earnings. Low-
earnings workers are defined as those whose earnings are below the 35th
percentile, measured in 1977 real earnings (at the national level). Medium-
earnings workers are between the 35th and 65th percentiles, and high-earnings
workers are those above the 65th percentile.15 Each worker in the sample is
placed into one of these three categories. I use this approximation to study
the impact of Democratic governors on the workforce composition relative to
Republican governors. It is a simple but efficient way to parse the data to see
if party affiliation alters labor force composition. The objective is to investi-
gate whether political parties affect the probability of being a low-, medium-
15Results are robust to alternative definitions of low, medium, and high earnings. Similar
results emerge from quantile regressions. However, the interpretation is not straightfor-
ward with interaction terms.
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or high-earnings worker. I conduct the exercise using annual earnings.16
Table 1.5 shows that the probability of being a low-earnings worker in-
creases (and, for men only, the probability of being a medium-earnings worker
increases) when Democratic governors are in office, while the probability of
being a high-earnings worker decreases. However, one cannot determine from
Table 1.5 if this effect is caused by an entry of low-earnings workers, high-
earnings workers transitioning to lower earnings, or a combination of these
two factors.
I use the log of the number of workers in each of the three earnings
categories as dependent variables and specification (1) to investigate which
explanation is most likely.17 The RD results are provided in Table 1.6, which
suggests that the effect is caused by an increase in the number of low-earnings
workers. Moreover, policies studied below also suggest there would be in-
creased numbers of low- and medium-earnings workers entering the labor
force.
Employment and labor force participation can also vary by level of educa-
tion. In Table 1.7, I study the probability of employment and the probability
of being in the labor force (dummy 0-1) of people with a high school diploma
or less education, compared with people with more education, using an in-
teraction term.18 Table 1.7 shows that under Democratic governors, less
educated workers work more relative to more educated workers. While it is
possible that less educated workers enter the labor market and earn a lot, it
is unlikely that a newcomer would earn more than average. Table 1.7 also
points to the same conclusion as above. Appendix E presents graphs for total
hours by gender, age and education for whites and blacks separately. As in
16Results are similar if hourly wage is used instead.
17I use an aggregate version of specification (1) without the Fb(MVst)×Blackist inter-
actions, since the entry of low-earnings workers into the labor market is the likely channel
through which the effect on black extensive margins occurs.
18I use specification (1) without the Fb(MVst) × Blackist interactions. I include an
interaction between a dummy for having at most a high school diploma and a dummy for
having a Democrat as governor.
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Table 1.7, it shows that less educated workers work more under Democratic
governors (this finding is true for both white and black workers).
1.7.2 Including the Share of Low- and Medium-Earnings
Workers in the Earnings Regression
The above section shows that there are changes in the composition of the
workforce under Democratic governors such that there are more low- and
medium-earnings workers. An important next step is to determine whether
these changes are also driving the decrease in earnings.
To investigate whether the changes in the composition of the labor force
explain the results, I include as additional controls the proportion of work-
ers that are low-earnings workers, and the proportion of workers that are
medium-earnings workers. I estimate models using a modification of spec-
ification (1) with annual earnings, weekly earnings, and hourly wages as
dependant variables.19 The results reported in Table 1.8 show that the im-
pact of Democratic governors on earnings almost disappears completely when
controlling for labor force composition, such that results are no longer sta-
tistically significant. This provides strong evidence that the change in labor
force composition is a key factor explaining the above results for earnings.
1.7.3 Policies and Channels
Overall, the evidence points to the party allegiance of governors having an
impact on the composition of the labor force by increasing low- and medium-
earnings workers. This in turn results in a decrease in average earnings. The
results also show an increase in employment of blacks. In this section, I
examine what policies may lead to these results. The aforementioned findings
are likely the result of a combination of policies. Table 1.9 presents potential
19I once again use specification (1) without the Fb(MVst)×Blackist interactions.
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policies and summarizes what policies are influenced by the party allegiance
of the governor. Detailed estimates are contained in Appendix G.
I find that Democratic governors have a small but statistically significant
impact on the probability that a woman works in the public sector and the
probability that any worker works in the public sector. Public-sector jobs
tend to be in the low- and medium-earnings categories. I also investigate
if political parties affect employment in the health and education sectors.
State funding might affect employment and hours worked in these sectors.20
Tables in Appendix G show that there is an increase in employment and
hours worked in the health and education sectors for women. In other words,
there is an increase in the proportion of low- and medium- earnings workers
under Democratic governors due in part by an increase in employment in
the public, health and education sectors and hours worked in the health and
education sectors.
State earned income tax credits (EITC) can also help explain the results.
The EITC is a refundable tax credit primarily for individuals and couples
with children. The indirect effect of the policy is to increase employment,
mostly of low- and medium-earnings workers (and particularly women). I
find that Democratic governors increase the probability that a state offers
an EITC and are also associated with higher levels of EITC.21 Adding state
EITC rates (percentage of the federal EITC) to specification (1) shows that
state EITC rates have a positive and statistically significant impact on to-
tal hours worked, labor force participation and employment for low-earnings
women. Moreover, state EITC rates do not reduce overall employment.
The literature suggests that Democratic governors are associated with
20I focus on nurses and support staff in the health sector and teachers, counselors and
support staff in the education sector. I exclude the post-secondary sector.
21I focus on 1990 to 2008, when several states implemented an EITC. Data
about state EITC is taken from UKCPR. More details about state EITC are
available at http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/States-and-Local-Governments-with-Earned-
Income-Tax-Credit.
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(slightly) higher minimum wages (Besley and Case, 1995 and Leigh, 2008)
and lower incarceration rates (Leigh, 2008), which I also confirm. Both
measures could increase the labor supply of low-earnings workers. I find
that, by adding state minimum wages to specification (1), the minimum
wage has a small positive and significant impact on total hours worked for
low-earnings workers, and has a small positive and significant impact on labor
force participation and employment for low-earnings workers. Doing the same
exercise with state incarceration rates, I find that a higher incarceration rate
has a small negative and significant impact on labor force participation and
employment for low-earnings workers. Neither the minimum wage nor the
incarceration rate affect overall employment. My results for the minimum
wage are consistent with studies such as Card and Krueger (1994, 2000).
Moreover, a higher proportion of black workers than white workers earn the
minimum wage, which helps explain the decrease in the earnings gap between
blacks and whites.
Democratic governors could also have an impact on the business sector.
I try to examine this in three ways. First, by looking at layoffs using the
Displaced Worker Survey (January CPS) to investigate whether Democratic
governors affect the probability of being displaced, I find that black men are
less likely to be a displaced worker under Democratic governors.22 This sug-
gests an increase in the intensive margins of black men relative to whites.
Moreover, under Democratic governors, displaced workers are less likely to
be low-earnings workers and more likely to be high-earnings workers.23 These
findings contribute to the increase in the share of low- and medium-earnings
workers in the labor market. As a second step, I add controls for occu-
pation and industry to my specification (1). Adding such controls reduces
22The Displaced Worker Survey has the same control variables as March CPS, and the
data is available every two years from 1984 to 2008. The definition of displaced worker
used here is similar to Neal (1995).
23Leigh (2008) calls this a “policy and economic conditions” variable, which represents
intermediate outcomes resulting from policy choices and economic conditions (i.e. a func-
tion of both the supply of, and demand for, welfare).
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the impact of political parties on annual earnings and total hours worked,
suggesting that there is an impact on occupation and industry composition.
Finally, I examine whether Democratic governors have an impact on business
dynamics. I use the following outcome variables provided by the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics: establishment entry rates, establish-
ment exit rates, firms’ job creation rates, firms’ job destruction rates, and
firms’ net job creation rates.24 I do not find that business dynamics are
affected by gubernatorial party allegiance.25
I also investigate the role of taxation (both corporate and personal), which
could affect workforce composition. I examine whether the decrease in earn-
ings reported in the previous tables holds after including income taxes us-
ing the NBER TAXSIM simulator. I find similar results after and before
tax. Therefore, taxation is not a factor explaining the increase of low- and
medium-earnings workers.26 Using the top corporate tax rate as an outcome
variable, I do not find that the party allegiance of the governor has an impact
on corporate taxation.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper is a broad study of the causal impact of party allegiance of
U.S. governors on labor market outcomes using a regression discontinuity
24All variables are available for all of my sample years.
25This analysis uses aggregate data, and does not consider the quality of firms created
and destroyed. Analyzing this problem using firm-level data, which was not available to
me, would be an interesting next step.
26I use family earnings because of the joint filing for married couples in the U.S. tax
system. After-tax income is obtained using the NBER TAXSIM simulator and before-tax
income and certain tax credits are obtained from the CPS. I use code provided by James P.
Ziliak to incorporate tax credit variables from the CPS into the NBER TAXSIM simulator.
The CPS does not have information on certain inputs for the TAXSIM program, such as
annual rental payments, child care expenses, and other itemized deductions. These values
are set to zero when calculating tax liability. The other variables of the TAXSIM simulator
are found in the CPS. Results in Table G.8 are similar if credits from the CPS are not
included in the TAXSIM simulation.
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approach to address the issue of the potential endogeneity of election results.
Results indicate that the party allegiance of U.S. governors affects earnings
and that Democratic governors are associated with lower individual earnings.
Moreover, the results presented in this paper provide evidence that Demo-
cratic governors reduce the average earnings gap between black and white
workers. There is also an increase in hours and employment of blacks relative
to whites under Democratic governors. I provide evidence that there is an
increase of low- and medium-earnings workers under Democratic governors
and that this change in the workforce composition is a main factor explaining
the results. The results are robust to alternative specifications and a rich set
of time-varying state characteristics. I find that an increase in public sector
employment, an increase in employment in the health and education sectors,
a higher state Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a (slightly) higher mini-
mum wage, a lower incarceration rate and an impact on worker displacement
under Democratic governors contribute to the increase in the employment of
low- and medium-earning workers and an increase in employment of blacks.
Although this paper improves our understanding of the importance of
party allegiance at the state level, more work is needed in this area to under-
stand the full extent of the role of political parties. I have provided evidence
of a short-term increase of low- and medium-earnings workers under Demo-
cratic governors. Subsequent research should investigate if this increase in
participation has long-term benefits for these groups, whether there are ef-
fects on related variables such as union wage premiums, and if there are
heterogeneous impacts within a state.
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FIGURE 1.1: Margin of Democratic victory and the proportion of whites (left) and blacks (right) who work 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.2: Margin of Democratic victory and total hours worked per year for whites (left) and blacks (right) 
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FIGURE 1.3: Margin of Democratic victory and the logarithm of white and black annual earnings gap  
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TABLE 1.1  -   Descriptive statistics of selected variables for states close to discontinuity 
    Black Age < 15 Age > 65 Age 20 to 55 
Margin of victory less than 5 % Republican 0.0999 0.2342 0.1197 0.5051 
  (0.0003) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0016) 
 Democrat 0.1003 0.2356 0.1170 0.5043 
  (0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
      
Margin of victory less than 10 % Republican 0.1002 0.2364 0.1204 0.5016 
  (0.0002) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
 Democrat 0.0998 0.2357 0.1163 0.5037 
   (0.0003) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0014) 
 
 
 
Elementary 
 
Some HS, 
HS or 
Some 
College 
College 
or more 
 
ln(population) 
 
Margin of victory less than 5 % Republican 0.2824 0.4946 0.2230 14.9865 
  (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0066) 
 Democrat 0.2779 0.5012 0.2208 14.9943 
  (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0079) 
      
Margin of victory less than 10 % Republican 0.2856 0.4982 0.2162 14.9926 
  (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0049) 
 Democrat 0.2813 0.4975 0.2212 14.9842 
   (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0056) 
This table reports the proportions of blacks and individuals less than 15 years old, older than 65, and between 20 and 55. It 
also reports the proportion of the population by the highest level of education completed: elementary school, some high school 
or a high-school diploma or some college, and a college degree or more, as well as the logarithm of the state’s population. 
Standard errors (of the mean) are in parentheses. Sources: March CPS data, UKCPR data, Leigh data (2008). 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                    28 
 
 
TABLE 1.2 - RD for hours worked, weeks worked and usual hours   
Intensive Variables   All Men Women 
 Democrat -0.63 -1.13 0.08 
Total hours   (0.68) (0.81) (0.77) 
worked Democrat  x  Black 3.79** 4.47** 2.33 
    (1.61) (2.00) (2.04) 
  Black -6.49*** -14.00*** -0.91 
    (1.02) (1.24) (1.25) 
          
 Democrat -0.15 -0.51 0.35 
Weeks    (0.45) (0.57) (0.54) 
worked Democrat x Black 2.91** 2.71* 2.68* 
    (1.18) (1.58) (1.42) 
  Black -6.00*** -8.81*** -4.13*** 
    (0.82) (1.08) (1.05) 
          
 Democrat -0.48 -0.62* -0.27 
Usual   (0.32) (0.32) (0.45) 
hours Democrat x Black 0.87 1.76** -0.35 
    (0.69) (0.73) (1.27) 
  Black -0.49 -5.19*** 3.22*** 
    (0.41) (0.49) (0.84) 
*** denotes statistically significant results at the 1% level, ** denotes statistically significant results at 
the 5% level, and * denotes statistically significant results at the 10% level. Control variables include 
highest level of education, marital status, age, age2, age3, age4, a female dummy, state fixed effects, and 
year fixed effects. Outcome variables are expressed in log form and coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses in the table) are multiplied by 100. Results are clustered at the state-term level. Source: 
March CPS data. 
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TABLE 1.3 – RD for being in labor force and employed 
Extensive Variables   All  Men Women 
In labor force Democrat -0.69* -0.26 -1.08* 
    (0.38) (0.35) (0.61) 
  Democrat  x Black 2.48** 1.37 3.65** 
    (1.21) (1.53) (1.48) 
  Black -4.71*** -8.75*** -2.61** 
    (0.89) (0.93) (1.24) 
          
Employed Democrat -0.77 -0.40 -1.11 
    (0.54) (0.58) (0.69) 
  Democrat x Black 2.59* 1.50 3.82** 
    (1.34) (1.70) (1.59) 
  Black -8.65*** -13.15*** -6.23*** 
    (1.00) (1.04) (1.33) 
*** denotes statistically significant results at the 1% level, ** denotes statistically significant results at 
the 5% level, and * denotes statistically significant results at the 10% level.  The controls are the same 
as in TABLE2. The in-labor-force variable is 1 if an individual is in the labor force and is 0 otherwise. 
The employed variable is 1 if an individual is employed, and is 0 if the individual is unemployed or out 
of the labor force. Estimates are generated using a linear probability model. Coefficients and standard 
errors (in parentheses in the table) are multiplied by 100. Results are clustered at the state-term level. 
Source: March CPS data. 
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TABLE 1.4 - RD for Earnings       
Earnings Variables   All  Men Women 
Annual Democrat -2.42* -3.00** -1.44 
    (1.23) (1.47) (1.29) 
  Democrat  x Black 5.03** 5.88** 2.56 
    (2.57) (3.00) (3.32) 
  Black -16.37*** -29.62*** -6.18*** 
    (1.40) (1.70) (1.99) 
       
Weekly Democrat -2.24** -2.49** -1.78* 
    (1.00) (1.14) (1.08) 
  Democrat x Black 2.11 3.28 -0.19 
    (2.07) (2.28) (2.84) 
  Black -10.35*** -20.92*** -1.99 
    (1.21) (1.33) (1.90) 
       
Hourly Democrat -1.76** -1.87** -1.51* 
    (0.82) (0.95) (0.88) 
  Democrat x Black 1.23 1.52 0.16 
    (1.77) (2.01) (2.14) 
  Black -9.86*** -15.73*** -5.21*** 
    (1.11) (1.24) (1.46) 
*** denotes statistically significant results at the 1% level, ** denotes statistically significant results 
at the 5% level and * denotes statistically significant results at the 10% level. The controls are the 
same as in TABLE2. Outcome variables are expressed in log form and coefficients and standard 
errors (in parentheses in the table) are multiplied by 100. Results are clustered at the state-term level. 
Source: March CPS data. 
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TABLE 1.5 -  Propensity of being a low-, medium- or high-earnings  worker 
Outcomes Variables All Men Women 
 Democrat 0.76** 0.38 1.10** 
Low-earnings workers   (0.30) (0.32) (0.44) 
Below 35th percentile  Democrat x Black -0.17 -0.47 0.50 
of 1977  annual earnings   (1.06) (1.22) (1.33) 
 Black 4.56*** 8.84*** 1.40 
    (0.68) (0.73) (0.87) 
       
 Democrat 0.26 1.15*** -0.77* 
Medium-earnings workers   (0.30) (0.38) (0.44) 
35th to 65th percentiles  Democrat x Black -1.08 -1.66 0.01 
of 1977 annual earnings   (0.99) (1.28) (1.22) 
 Black 2.50*** 3.95*** 0.91 
    (0.65) (0.77) (0.84) 
       
 Democrat -1.03*** -1.54*** -0.35 
High-earnings workers   (0.27) (0.38) (0.32) 
Above 65th percentile Democrat x Black 1.28* 2.12** -0.46 
of 1977 annual earnings   (0.70) (1.00) (0.90) 
 Black -7.06*** -12.77*** -2.33*** 
    (0.48) (0.66) (0.60) 
*** denotes statistically significant results at the 1% level, ** denotes statistically significant results at the 5% level 
and * denotes statistically significant results at the 10% level.  The controls are the same as in TABLE2. Estimates 
are generated using a linear probability model. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses in the table) are 
multiplied by 100. Source: March CPS data. 
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TABLE 1.6 - Coefficient estimates for number of workers in each category 
Outcomes Democrat 
Number of low-earnings workers   
Below 35th percentile    2.13** 
of 1977  annual earnings (1.05) 
   
   
Number of medium-earnings workers  
35th to 65th percentiles 0.64 
of 1977 annual earnings (1.12) 
   
   
Number of high-earnings workers -0.46 
Above 65th percentile (1.14) 
of 1977  annual earnings  
*** denotes statistically significant results at the 1% level, ** denotes statistically significant results at the 5% 
level and * denotes statistically significant results at the 10% level.  Estimates are generated using an aggregate 
version of specification (1) without the Fb(MVst) ×  Blackist  interactions. Outcome variables are expressed in log 
form and coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses in the table) are multiplied by 100. Source: March 
CPS data. 
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TABLE 1.7 -  RD for probability of being in labor force and employed   
Extensive Variables All Men Women 
 Democrat -0.51** -0.37 -0.76** 
In labor    (0.23) (0.26) (0.33) 
force Democrat x (<=high school diploma) 0.73*** 1.13*** 0.61* 
    (0.24) (0.24) (0.31) 
       
Employed Democrat -0.72*** -0.46 -1.10*** 
    (0.28) (0.33) (0.39) 
  Democrat x  (<=high school diploma) 0.66** 1.10*** 0.51 
    (0.28) (0.30) (0.33) 
*** denotes statistically significant results at the 1% level, ** denotes statistically significant results at the 5% level 
and * denotes statistically significant results at the 10% level.  Estimates are generated using a regression similar to 
equation (1) without the Fb(MVst ) × Blackist  interactions for annual and weekly earnings and hourly wages and 
controls for the share of low- and medium-earnings workers. Additional controls are the same as in TABLE2.  
Outcome variables are expressed in log form and coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses in the table) are 
multiplied by 100. Source: March CPS data. 
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*** denotes statistically significant results at the 1% level, ** denotes statistically significant results at the 5% level 
and *  denotes statistically significant results at the 10% level.  Estimates are generated using a regression of equation 
(1) without the Fb(MVst ) × Blackist  interactions  for annual and weekly earnings and hourly wages and controls for the 
share of low- and medium-earnings workers. Additional controls are the same as in TABLE2.  Outcome variables are 
expressed in log form and coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses in the table) are multiplied by 100. Source: 
March CPS data. 
 
  
TABLE 1.8 – RD for annual, weekly and hourly earnings including share of workers. 
Earnings Variable All Men Women 
Annual  Democrat  -0.39 -0.61 -0.18 
    (0.53) (0.64) (0.81) 
       
Weekly Democrat  -0.56 -0.60 -0.94 
    (0.41) (0.53) (0.58) 
       
Hourly  Democrat  -0.53 -0.38 -0.72 
    (0.37) (0.47) (0.52) 
          
Includes the share of yes yes yes 
low- and medium-earnings workers       
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Table 1.9 - Summary table of policies           
Policy   
Partisan Allegiance 
has      Impact of Democrats 
    significant impact?         
State Public Sector Yes     Higher employment 
              
Health and Education Sector Yes     Higher employment 
          and hours worked 
              
              
Minimum Wage Yes     Slightly higher and increased 
              
Incarceration Rate Yes     Lower   
              
State EITC Yes     More frequent and higher 
              
Business sector           
   Business Dynamics Statistics No         
   Controling for occupation and industry Yes     Smaller coefficients 
   Job displacement via Displaced worker survey Yes     Black are less displaced 
          
Displaced worker are less 
 low earners 
              
Taxation             
          Corporate No     -   
          Household No     -   
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Chapter 2
The Effect of High School
Shootings on Schools and Student
Performance
Authors: Louis-Philippe Béland and Dongwoo Kim
2.1 Introduction
There have been a total of 157 deadly school shootings in U.S. high schools
between 1994 and 2009. Although shootings at schools account for a rel-
atively small number teenage murders, they are not unprecedented in U.S.
high schools and the threat of these shootings is ubiquitous. These shooting
incidents are often mentioned in national policy discussions because of broad
concerns over child safety despite the relatively low number of incidents. For
two consecutive years, in 2013 and 2014, the President mentioned in his State
of the Union address the negative effects of gun violence in schools. In addi-
tion, gun violence affecting teenagers raises the demand for a national debate
on gun control.
Deadly school shootings have a potentially large effect on students and
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schools once they occur. These incidents can affect students’ decision about
whether to stay at their school, affect their cognitive skills, and influence
their behavior during their time at school. The educational consequences
of deadly school shootings on enrollment and student performance have not
been analyzed.
We address three questions related to the consequences of homicidal and
suicidal high school shootings. First, we address whether enrollment pat-
terns change after the shootings, which would result from school selection
by students and parents or from students dropping out of the school system.
Second, we examine whether deadly shootings lower test scores in schools in
subsequent years, which helps to establish longer-term trauma effects. Third,
we look at the effects deadly shootings have on a range of behavioral variables
such as graduation, attendance, and suspension rates.
This paper provides the first empirical estimates of the effect of extreme
violence in schools on enrollment, student performance, and student behav-
ior. Potential negative effects of school shootings on student achievement
are important for policy makers, especially when deciding whether or not to
allocate resources toward creating a safer school environment. To estimate
this, we merge an existing database on fatal shootings with the high-school-
level Common Core of Data (CCD) and school report cards to form a panel
of schools.
We estimate the causal impact of deadly high school shootings by using a
difference-in-difference strategy, comparing schools that had fatal shootings
with other high schools in the same district that did not experience such
shootings. Because we compare schools within the same district, our com-
parison group exhibits an environment similar to our group of interest aside
from the turmoil generated by the shooting. Our empirical strategy relies on
the assumption that these deadly school shooting incidents are exogenous in
their timing.
We find that enrollment in grade nine drops following a deadly shooting,
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though we do not observe enrollment effects on subsequent grades. We also
find standardized test scores in math and English are lower in affected schools
up to three years after a deadly shooting. However, we do not find statis-
tically significant impacts on behavioral outcomes: graduation, attendance,
or suspension rates. We find that suicidal shootings have no significant im-
pact on our variables of interest. This leaves open the question of whether
students are affected by shootings or if differences in performance instead
reflect a composition effect due to high-achieving students leaving the school
following a shooting, which then results in lower average scores. To address
this question, we use student-level data from California. This data allows us
to identify the average treatment effect of shootings, conditional on students
staying at the same high school after a shooting. Using student-level panel
data from California high schools, we find that shootings have a negative
effect on continuing students’ math and English test scores.
2.2 Framework
Student violence in high schools may hinder students from learning efficiently.
Extreme violent incidents could be a distraction from learning; fear and an
unsafe atmosphere could impede students from being open to new opportu-
nities that are essential to learning and, even more problematically, students
may avoid attending school. Also, violent incidents could affect the allo-
cation of teaching time. These factors could influence students’ cognitive
performance and behavioral outcomes.
Multiple studies show that students are negatively affected by violent
crimes on several dimensions. Berman et al. (1996) find that students who
have been exposed to violent crimes show a greater number of post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms. Among those who were exposed to a
violent crime, 44.3 percent were categorized as having “moderate” PTSD
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symptoms and 18.6 percent as ‘severe’ PTSD symptoms.1 Berman et al. find
that victims and witnesses exhibit a similar number of PTSD symptoms.
Likewise, Pynoos et al. (1987) find that elementary school students ex-
perienced PTSD after a fatal sniper attack on their school playground.2 The
severity of PTSD was worse for all exposure levels if the students knew the
victim well. However, they find no difference in severity by age, sex, or
ethnicity.
Building on evidence that violent crime causes PTSD, McEwen and Sapol-
sky (1995) demonstrate that stress, which is more common in people aﬄicted
with PTSD, increases the frequency of declarative errors, but has no effect on
tasks that have fewer declarative and more procedural components. Declar-
ative knowledge involves explicit knowledge of a fact, whereas procedural
knowledge is implicit knowledge of how to do something.
Recent papers study the effects of school violence. Poutvaara and Rop-
ponen (2010) analyze the immediate effect of a school shooting in September
2008 at a school in Finland in the middle of a national exam period that
lasts 2-3 weeks. They find that the shooting decreased average test scores
for boys but not for girls. Since a fatal shooting can be considered exogenous
to other determinants of educational outcomes, Poutvaara and Ropponen’s
estimates can be interpreted as causal.3
Other papers that study the effect of neighborhood violence on student
performance include Grogger (1997) and Sharkey (2010). Both of these pa-
pers show that students are negatively affected by violence in their neighbor-
hood. Grogger (1997) studies how local violence, defined as a combination of
1The categorization is based on the Frederick scoring system of the Post-traumatic
Stress Disorder Reaction Index (PTSD-RI).
2On Feb 24, 1984, a sniper began firing from a second-story window across the street
from an elementary school at children on the school playground. Two children were killed
and 13 were injured.
3Chandler et al. (2011) build a predictive model of shootings, which helps determine
which students should be included in a highly targeted and resource-intensive mentorship
program in Chicago. Chandler et al. (2010) find that shootings are very hard to predict.
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school violence and neighborhood violence, negatively affects educational at-
tainment. Sharkey (2010) identifies the negative effect of exposure to a local
homicide on the cognitive performance of children. He finds that a sample
of African-American children between five and 17 years old had lower scores
on educational assessments when they were exposed to a homicide in the
Census block group less than a week before the assessment. Finally, Carrell
and Hoekstra (2010) find that children who suffer from domestic violence
significantly decrease the reading and math test scores of their peers and
increase the amount of misbehavior in the classroom.
Our paper aims to improve the understanding of how extreme violence
in schools affects enrollment, student performance, and student behavior,
based on a sample of deadly shootings that occurred between 1994 and 2009.
We also analyze student performance using nationwide aggregated school-
level data up to three years after the shooting, and student-level data from
California. Moreover, we hypothesize that homicidal shootings cause more
severe effects on students compared to suicidal shootings, and confirm this
by analyzing homicidal and suicidal shootings separately. This suggests that
the traumatic impact of homicidal shootings plays a key role in explaining
our results.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our main data source of shooting incidents is the Report on School Asso-
ciated Violent Deaths from the National School Safety Center (2010). The
report uses newspaper articles to track shootings between 1994 and 2009.4
Additional school shooting data is from Washington Ceasefire and the Na-
tional School Safety and Security Services, which we verified with information
from newspaper clippings.
4We use the year of the fall semester to indicate the school year. For instance, we refer
to the 2001-02 school year as 2001.
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We use the National School Safety Center’s definition of a deadly school
shooting, which is any homicidal or suicidal gun-related death in the United
States that occurred on the property of a functioning public, private or
parochial secondary school; on the way to or from regular sessions at such a
school; while a person was attending or was on the way to or from a school-
sponsored event; or as an obvious direct result of school incidents, functions
or activities, whether on or off a school bus, school vehicle or school property.
As shown in Figure 2.1, we document 157 shootings in high schools be-
tween 1994 and 2009 that resulted in one or more deaths. These shooting
schools contained approximately 245,391 enrolled students, who may have
suffered negative direct or indirect consequences from the event. We do not
detect any trend in the annual number of deadly shootings. Among the 157
shootings that occurred in high schools, 104 were categorized as homicidal
and 53 were suicidal incidents. Among the 104 homicidal shootings, 27 in-
volved multiple deaths (ranging from 2 to 15 people).5
Data on school characteristics is from the Common Core of Data (CCD)
from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) from 1990 to 2009.
The data set provides a complete listing of all public elementary and sec-
ondary schools in the U.S. and provides basic information and descriptive
statistics on schools, their students, and their teachers. We use CCD data
for enrollment per grade (grades 9 to 12) and number of teachers.6
We define our comparison group as other high schools in the same district.
Schools in the same district have many similar unobservable characteristics.
As Figure 2.2 reveals, enrollment in other schools in the same district is
not negatively affected by shootings. Thus, it is very unlikely that we dou-
ble count the movement of students from shooting schools to comparison
schools. Our estimates can be viewed as a lower bound of the true effect of
5When a person killed someone else and then committed suicide, we categorized the in-
cident as a homicidal shooting. We classify accidental gun-related deaths in the homicidal
category.
6There is no information on teacher turnover at the school level in the CCD.
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school shootings on student outcomes because the comparison schools could
be influenced due to their physical proximity, albeit at a different magnitude.
Figure 2.2 shows a permanent decrease in entrance grade 9 enrollment after
a shooting takes place.
Table 2.1 shows that schools that experience shootings are larger than
average, both in terms of the number of total enrolled students and in full-
time equivalent teachers (FTEs). This size difference is present in all grades
and is noticeably larger in grade 9, the entrance grade for most high schools
and before students are permitted to drop out of school.
School performance data is from each state’s Department of Education
website. A student’s ability in math and English is tested at least once dur-
ing high school using a standardized test. Information is extracted from each
school’s report card and from data files posted by each state’s Department of
Education. We focus on data from 2002 to 2010 due to availability. The No
Child Left Behind Act passed in 2001 requires all schools receiving federal
funding to administer a state-wide standardized test; in most states, these re-
sults are posted online. Most states only publish the proportion of a school’s
students who fall into various categories of achievement, such as “minimum,”
“basic,” “proficient” and “advanced” performance, rather than the actual mean
scores of the schools. We use the proportion of students achieving a proficient
or advanced level on math and English state-wide standardized tests for each
school, which we refer to as the “proficiency rate,” as the outcome variable.
These tests vary from state to state but are identical within a state for any
given year.7 As Table 2.1 shows, the mean proficiency rate is not statistically
7We examine the relationship between 36 high school shootings and the proportion
of students achieving a proficient- or advanced-level result on English tests in 14 states.
We also examine the relationship between 34 high school shootings and the proportion of
students achieving a proficient- or advanced-level result on math tests in 13 states. Not all
states have both test results posted on their Department of Education websites, which is
the reason why the sample size is different for math and English tests. English test results
are from Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. Math test results
are from Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina,
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different between “shooting schools” and comparison schools. Figures 2.3 and
2.4 display the average proficiency rate for the years before and the years after
any shooting incidents for shooting schools and comparison schools, which
show a decline in the math and English proficiency rates in the years following
a homicidal shooting for schools that experienced a shooting.
In addition, we collected school-level graduation rates, average daily at-
tendance rates, and numbers of suspensions per 100 students for all schools
in the districts that experienced shootings in all available states.8
We use student-level data from California. The data is provided by the
California Department of Education (CDE) for 2007 to 2010. During that
period, seven deadly high school shootings occurred in seven school districts.
The seven affected school districts have 195 high schools within their bound-
aries and a large number of students. The data contains test results on the
California Standards Tests (CST). The CSTs, which are part of the California
Standardized Testing and Reporting (STAR) program, are taken by students
from grades 2 through 11 in many subjects, but we use only math and En-
glish results from grades 9 through 11. We have measures of the proficiency
level in math and English for students in the seven districts. The possible
levels of math and English proficiency for students in the seven districts are:
far below basic (1), below basic (2), basic (3), proficient (4), and advanced
(5). We also have information on the sex of the students, which allows us to
determine whether shootings affect males and females differently.
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
8We have information on graduation rates and attendance rates for shooting-affected
school districts for ten shootings in five states (Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Utah) and information on numbers of suspensions per 100 students for
seven shootings in three states (Nevada, North Carolina, and Tennessee).
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2.4 Methodology
We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy to analyze the effect of
deadly homicidal high school shootings. The comparison group consists of
all other high schools in the same district. We estimate
Yit = β0 + β1Afterit + β2Afterit ∗ Shootingi + µi + γt + it (2.1)
where Yit is one of several different outcome variables for school i in year
t; Shootingi is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there was ever a
shooting in school i and 0 otherwise; and Afterit is an indicator for the period
after the shootings.9 The coefficient of the interaction variable (Afterit ∗
Shootingi) is of primary interest, as it captures the casual effect of school
shootings on various outcomes. The outcomes of interest are: enrollment per
grade (9 to 12), number of teachers, proficiency rate (in math and English),
and behavioral variables (graduation, suspension and attendance rates). We
include school fixed effects, µi for school i, to control for any time-invariant
school-level factors that may be correlated with shootings and the outcome
variables. We also include year fixed effects to control for any policy changes
or trends from 1994 to 2009.10 We use clustered standard errors at the district
level. We use a three-year window around the shooting year.11
9The “after” period is defined differently for the enrollment analysis and the proficiency
rate analysis. For the enrollment analysis, the “after” period starts the school year following
the shooting, since enrollment data is typically generated very early in the school year
(usually in September or October). For proficiency rate analysis, the “after” period starts
the same year as the shooting, since the tests are usually administered towards the end of
a school year.
10We tested different specifications of the model, such as using district and year fixed
effects (controlling for enrollment three years prior), which lead to similar results. Results
of this specification can be provided upon request.
11The nature of difference-in-differences estimation requires us to check whether the
schools and districts have multiple shootings over the sample period. Multiple shootings
in one school or district could bias our estimates because the “before” and “after” periods of
the shootings could overlap with those of another shooting in the same school or district.
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We also present matching regression estimates based on four character-
istics of the school: state, area (city, suburb, town or rural), size of school
and number of teachers. Using these variables, Kernel, Caliper and Nearest
Neighbor matching estimators are employed.
To identify whether negative effects of school shootings result from stu-
dents being directly affected by shootings or from a composition effect (e.g.
students with a high level of achievement might not stay or register at a
school after a shooting), we use student-level data and condition on having a
test result before and after a shooting at the same school.12 We use a similar
empirical strategy for student-level data as for school-level data, so that we
can exploit the panel aspect of the data at the student level. We estimate
conditional logit models with student-level fixed effects. The primary out-
come variables of interest are whether a student is proficient in English and
math (whether the student achieves level 4 or 5 in California).
We also investigate the possibility that shootings have heterogeneous ef-
fects in two ways. First, we investigate whether shootings affect students in
various parts of the test-score distribution differently. To study the most af-
fected part of the distribution, we change the outcome variables in the same
regression to the probability of being in level 2 to 5, level 3 to 5, and level 5
to identify which part of the distribution is generating the lower level of test
results in schools that experienced a shooting. Second, we study whether
boys are affected differently than girls.
High school shootings occur only once in most school districts over the 16 school years;
103 school districts had one shooting, 12 school districts had two shootings, and six school
districts had three or more shootings. In our analysis, additional to all initial shootings in
a district, we include subsequent shootings in a district if they are six or more years apart.
We view shootings six or more years apart as distinct because almost all students who
experience a shooting leave their school within three years, which could be interpreted as
the school returning to its pre-shooting environment. Another rationale for a three-year
window around the year of shootings is that using the entire sample for the difference-in-
differences estimator will contain noise in years far from the shooting incidents. This leads
us to use a three-year window sample for all analysis.
12Similar results are found if we restrict the sample to two observations per student, one
before and one after a shooting (balanced panel).
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2.5 Results
Table 2.2 reveals that homicidal shooting schools experienced a decline in
grade 9 enrollment relative to other schools in the same district.13 Table
2.2 shows that a shooting reduces enrollment in grade 9 by 28 students on
average, which represents a 5.8 percent decline in grade 9 enrollment for the
average school experiencing a shooting. This decrease in grade 9 enrollment
represents a large change in school selection by students entering high school.
One possible explanation for the large decline in grade 9 enrollment is that
middle school students and their parents try to avoid the school that had the
shooting.14
Enrollment in other grades and the number of teachers employed do not
show a statistically significant change after a shooting.15 The fact that enroll-
ment for grades 10, 11, and 12 does not significantly change the following year
after a shooting suggests that continuing students in schools experiencing a
shooting have established connections that raise the cost of transferring to
another school. It is also likely to be administratively difficult for continuing
students to transfer.
Table 2.8 presents regression results for enrollment in grades 10 and 11,
excluding either the first year or the first two years after a shooting. It
shows that a decrease in enrollment for the entrance grade (grade 9) immedi-
ately following a shooting is followed by a decrease in the number of student
13We use a subset of high schools for the enrollment analysis, which is high schools where
the lowest grade is grade 9 and highest grade is grade 12, to ensure a clear interpretation
of the coefficient. Among the 157 high school shootings, 136 occurred in high schools that
have grades 9 through 12 over the sample period. Results are robust to the inclusion of
all high schools.
14Smith et al. (2012), for example, find that parents and students change enrollment
decisions in response to negative news about schools.
15We do not have information on teacher turnover in the data. It is possible that some
teachers leave after a shooting and are replaced by younger teachers. An alternative
approach would be to use the student to teacher ratio as an outcome variable. The
coefficient for the student to teacher ratio is positive but not significant. Results are
available upon request.
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enrolled in grade 10 (after one year) and grade 11 (after two years).
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.3 show that the proficiency rate decreases after
homicidal shooting incidents relative to comparison schools. Table 2.3 indi-
cates that the proficiency rate in math is reduced by 4.9 percentage points,
which means that the proficiency rate in math decreased by 9.3 percent for
the average school experiencing a shooting. For English tests, the effect of
shootings is of a slightly smaller magnitude, 3.9 percentage points lower than
the comparison schools. This means that in the average school experiencing
a shooting, 6.2 percent fewer students achieve a “proficient” or “advanced”
level on their English tests.
Columns 3 to 5 of Table 2.3 show the causal effect of deadly shootings on
graduation rates, average daily attendance rates, and the number of suspen-
sions per 100 students. We do not find any statistically significant results for
all three outcomes.
Table 2.4 presents results for the impact of suicidal shootings on outcome
variables: enrollment per grade (9 to 12), number of teachers, and the profi-
ciency rate in math and English.16 Suicidal shootings can be an important
aspect of school shootings as Lang (2013) finds that gun ownership rate is
positively associated with firearm suicide rate.
Table 2.4 shows that suicidal shootings have no significant impact on any
outcome of interest.17 This suggests that homicidal shootings may be more
traumatic for students than suicidal shootings.
Results from the school-level analysis indicate that a large number of
students are likely to change their school selection due to school shootings.
This implies that identified school-level effect is a total effect, which is a sum
of compositional change and individual effect. Total effect has high policy
relevance, however, separating the individual effect will allow us to isolate
the true shock on students’ educational outcomes from school shootings.
16We do not have enough observations to study behavioral outcomes for suicidal shoot-
ings.
17The sample size is smaller than homicidal shootings and standard errors are bigger.
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Individual effect is identified by using student-level data and by conditioning
on students staying in the same schools after shooting incidents.
Using California student-level data, Table 2.5 shows 4.2 and 10.2 percent-
age point decreases in the probability of achieving a proficient-level result
(achievement level 4 or 5 in California) in math and English, respectively.
These results suggest that the decrease in test scores is not solely due to
fewer high-achieving students attending schools where shootings occurred.18
This suggests that students’ academic achievement worsens.
Table 2.6 identifies the effect of shootings on the probability of reach-
ing various achievement levels. It shows that shootings have heterogeneous
effects on the math test results. For math tests, the negative effects are
concentrated on students who are at the high achievement part of the dis-
tribution. The negative effect of shootings on the probability of reaching
achievement level 5 in math tests is large, 10.4 percentage points, which is
as large as English test results. The magnitude of the effect of shootings
decreases as the achievement level of interest goes down, almost disappear-
ing when looking at the probability of achieving level 3 or higher. However,
the negative effect is consistent throughout the distribution for English test
results. Lastly, when we analyze the effects of shooting by gender, we find
that male and female students are both similarly affected by shootings with
respect to their English test results (see Table 2.7). Shootings negatively
affect math test results for females, but not for males.
Individual effect identified by student-level analysis shows that students’
math and English test scores are directly affected by school shootings. These
results confirm that effect of school shootings are coming from both composi-
tional change and individual effect. Also, this suggests that academic aspects
should be helped in addition to other counselings provided to students in the
aftermath of shootings.
18The results are similar when we restrict the sample to students who stay in the same
school district as well as to those who do not repeat a grade.
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2.6 Robustness
We do several tests to ensure that our results are robust and valid.
First, we conduct a randomization of the shooting incidents. We ran-
domize the shootings within the school districts for the year the shooting
took place and re-run baseline regressions for our main outcome variables:
the proficiency rate in math and English, as well as enrollment in grade 9.
The rationale behind this randomization is to provide confidence that our
significant results are not caused by a factor other than the shootings. We
do 1,000 replications and find that it is unlikely that the results are random.
Figure 2.5 and 2.6 present histograms of t values and coefficients by intervals
for our main variable of interest. Results from this randomization and these
figures give confidence to our results.
Second, our results are robust to alternate specifications, such as using
district fixed effects instead of school fixed effects. Results are also robust
to alternate error clustering, such as clustering at the state level or using a
block bootstrap specification at the state level.
Third, we check that our results are not driven by extreme shooting in-
cidents where multiple people die (the effect on students could arguably be
higher in these cases). Restricting the sample to school shootings where only
one person dies leads to a similar conclusion for the proficiency rates on math
and English tests as well as enrollment in grade 9.
Fourth, in Table 2.9, we also present matching regression estimates based
on state, area (city, suburb, town or rural), size of school and number of
teachers. We get similar estimates from three types of matching estimates
(Kernel, Caliper and Nearest Neighbor) but larger coefficients than our main
results. This implies that our preferred estimates could be a lower bound of
the true effect of deadly school shootings on educational outcomes.
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2.7 Conclusion
We analyze the causal effect of deadly shooting incidents in high schools on
these schools and their students. We find that enrollment declines in grade 9
(the high school entrance grade) in schools that experience homicidal shoot-
ings. Furthermore, math and English standardized test proficiency rates drop
significantly in schools that experience a shooting. However, we do not find
a detrimental effect of shootings on suspension, graduation, or average daily
attendance rates. We find that there is no significant impact for suicidal
shootings. To settle whether students are directly affected by shootings or if
it is rather a composition effect, we use student-level data from California.
We find that students are directly affected by shootings. There is a decrease
in probability of being at proficiency level 4 or 5 (a high achievement level)
for math and English tests.
The negative effect of shootings on student achievement on math and
English tests could be an important factor in determining wages and em-
ployment for these students in the long-run. If students attending schools
that experienced a shooting have lower test scores, they might be accepted
into less selective colleges, which could lead to lower earnings later in life
(Hoekstra, 2009). Moreover, several studies document the links between
student performance and labor market outcomes at adulthood. Neal and
Johnson (1996) find that scores from tests administered between the ages of
14 and 21 are highly significant predictors of wages at age 26 to 29. Mur-
nane, Willett, and Levy (1995) show that test scores from one’s senior year
of high school are related to wages at age 24. Currie and Thomas (2001)
find that a one standard deviation increase in test scores at age 16 translates
into a higher wage rate and higher probability of being employed at age 33.
Thus, even though we are looking at the short-run impact, school shootings
are likely to have long-run negative effects on students too. Future research
should try to answer this question.
Our estimates indicate that schools and students, on average, are highly
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affected when there is a homicidal shooting. These results indicate that pol-
icymakers should consider providing extra support to all students in schools
where a shooting occurs. It also suggests that more effort should be invested
in preventive measures such as gun control (Duggan, 2001; Marvell, 2001;
Lott and Whitley, 2001) and more resources should be made available to
students (Carrell and Hoekstra, 2011), especially in the aftermath of shoot-
ings. More research should be done regarding the negative effect of high
school shootings, such as on the long-term effects of shootings on students
since there are direct and indirect burden of crime for students and the entire
nation (Anderson, 1999).
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Figure 2.1: Number of Shootings By Type of Shooting
Source: Report on School Associated Violent Deaths from the National School
Safety Center (2010), Washington Ceasefire, and the National School Safety and
Security Services.
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Figure 2.2: The Effect of Shootings on Grade 9 Enrollment (Entrance Grade)
Source: Common Core of Data (CCD) from the National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES).
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Figure 2.3: The Effect of Shootings on math Proficiency Rate
Source: Information was extracted from each school’s report card and from data
files posted by each state’s Department of Education.
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Figure 2.4: The Effect of Shootings on English Proficiency Rate
Source: Information was extracted from each school’s report card and from data
files posted by each state’s Department of Education.
Figure 2.5: Distribution of t-values from Randomization for Enrollment in
Grade 9, English, and Math
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of Coefficients from Randomization for Enrollment
in grade 9, English, and math. Verticical line represents estimates from our
main specification.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics - High Schools before a shooting
All Shooting Schools Comparison Schools
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Enrollment in
Grade 9 486 283 436 344
Grade 10 426 238 378 289
Grade 11 352 196 314 240
Grade 12 298 171 262 202
Total Students 1587 835 1408 1044
FTE Teachers 80 37 73 47
English 65.4 23.0 60.5 27.9
Math 57.8 24.3 52.9 28.6
Graduation Rate 71.5 13.6 72.3 17.8
Attendance Rate 92.8 3.5 91.3 3.9
Suspension Rate 19.6 17.7 18.3 18.0
Note: Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for key variables for shooting
schools and our comparison schools for the three years before the shooting.
Enrollment and teacher variables are from the Common Core of Data. Test
results and behavioral variables are from school report cards. Only high
schools with grades 9 to 12 are included in the enrollment and teacher sam-
ple. All high schools are included in the test results and behavioral sample.
Math and English variables are the proficiency rate from standardized tests.
FTE Teachers are full time equivalent teachers. Suspension rate is num-
ber of suspensions per 100 students. The comparison schools are all other
schools in the shooting district. Using a t-test or Wilcoxson test, we find
that shooting schools are statistically different in terms of students (grade 9
to 12 and total students) and number of teachers but not for proficiency in
English and math, as well as graduation, attendance, and suspension rates.
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Table 2.2: The Effect of Homicidal Shootings on Enrollment
Enrollment in Grade # of
9 10 11 12 Total Teachers
After -3.48 -6.46 -8.08** 0.92 -14.27 0.57
(7.03) (4.51) (4.09) (2.62) (12.61) (1.25)
After*Shooting School -28.41*** -8.84 6.96 -3.71 -37.79 -1.78
(10.92) (8.37) (9.30) (6.69) (23.97) (1.28)
Observations 5,385 5,386 5,394 5,392 5,397 5,222
R-squared 0.842 0.890 0.875 0.850 0.941 0.901
Note: Table 2.2 presents difference-in-differences regression estimates for the number of
student in grades 9 to 12 and the number of teachers. The coefficient of interest is Af-
ter*Shooting School. We use clustered standard errors at the district level. Coefficients
for school and year fixed effects are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Common Core of Data (CCD) from the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES).
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Table 2.3: The Effect of Homicidal Shootings on Test Results and Behavioral
Variables
Fraction Proficient in Rate of
Math English Graduation Attendance Suspension
After -3.48 -3.52** 0.81 -1.29*** 1.02
(2.31) (1.58) (1.34) (0.46) (1.34)
After*Shooting School -4.92*** -3.93*** 0.40 0.62 -2.28
(1.18) (1.07) (1.19) (0.39) (1.55)
Observations 1,412 1,425 566 501 462
R-squared 0.606 0.668 0.254 0.366 0.669
Note: Table 2.3 presents difference-in-difference regression estimates for math and English pro-
ficiency rate, graduation, attendance and suspension rates. The coefficient of interest is Af-
ter*Shooting School. We use clustered standard errors at the district level. Coefficients for school
and year fixed effects are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Test results and other variables are extracted from each school’s report card and from
data files posted by each state’s Department of Education.
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Table 2.4: The Effect of Suicidal Shootings
Enrollment in Grade
9 10 11 12
After -2.04 -8.50 -1.16 2.02
(10.31) (6.99) (5.02) (3.51)
After*Shooting School 22.70 -2.69 3.77 0.88
(17.61) (14.03) (14.41) (8.52)
Total Number of Fraction Proficient in
Students Teachers Math English
After -13.25 0.48 -3.39 0.64
(17.19) (0.78) (10.18) (7.08)
After*Shooting School 26.59 0.09 7.50 -5.59
(39.16) (1.49) (10.59) (6.29)
Note: Table 2.4 investigates the effect of suicidal shootings. We run regres-
sions for enrollment per grade, number of teachers, proficiency in math and
English and behavioral outcomes for suicidal shootings. The coefficient of
interest is After*Shooting School. We use clustered standard errors at the
district level. Coefficients for school and year fixed effects are not shown. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Enrollment data are from the Common Core of Data (CCD) from
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Test results and other
variables are extracted from each school’s school report card and from data
files posted by each state’s Department of Education.
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Table 2.5: The Effect of Shootings using California Student Level Data -
2007-2011
Probability of Proficiency Level in
Math(Level 4 or 5) English (Level 4 or 5)
After -0.079*** -0.015
(0.010) (0.009)
After*Shooting School -0.042** -0.102***
(0.017) (0.017)
Observations 246,864 270,114
Number of Students 120,924 125,949
Note: Table 2.5 investigates the impact of shootings on students using
student-level data from the California Department of Education. Using con-
ditional fixed effects logit models with student-level fixed effects, we study the
probability of students achieving level 4 or 5 in math and English. The sam-
ple is restricted to students who took tests both before and after a shooting.
The level of math and English proficiency for students in the 7 districts are:
far below basic (1), below basic (2), basic (3), proficient (4), and advanced
(5).To correct for autocorrelation, we cluster errors at the district level. Es-
timates for student and year fixed effects are not shown. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Student-level data from California provided by the California De-
partment of Education (CDE).
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Table 2.6: The Effect of Shootings on Cumulative Level of Achievement
Probability of Student Reaching Achievement Level
2, 3, 4, or 5 3, 4 or 5 4 or 5 5
Math Test 0.005 -0.012 -0.042** -0.104***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.039)
English Test -0.106*** -0.116*** -0.102*** -0.104***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
Note: Table 2.6 investigates the distributional impact of shootings on stu-
dents using student-level data from the California Department of Educa-
tion. Using conditional fixed effects logit models with student-level fixed ef-
fects, we study the probability of students achieving various levels on math
and English tests after a shooting. The sample is restricted to students
who took tests both before and after a shooting. The level of math and
English proficiency for students in the 7 districts are: far below basic (1),
below basic (2), basic (3), proficient (4), and advanced (5). Column 1 esti-
mates the probability of reaching achievement level 2, 3, 4, or 5 after the
shooting. As we move right from column 1, the remaining columns restrict
the outcome to higher levels of achievement. The coefficient of interest is
After*Shooting School for math and English tests. Estimates for student
and year fixed effects are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Student-level data from California provided by the California De-
partment of Education (CDE).
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Table 2.7: The Effect of Shootings by Gender using Student-Level Data
Male Students Probability of Achieving Proficiency in
Math (Level 4 or 5) English (Level 4 or 5)
After -0.062*** -0.010
(0.014) (0.013)
After*Shooting School -0.030 -0.094***
(0.023) (0.024)
Observations 125,649 138,731
Number of Students 62,238 65,190
Female Students Probability of Achieving Proficiency in
Math (Level 4 or 5) English (Level 4 or 5)
After -0.098*** -0.020
(0.015) (0.013)
After*Shooting School -0.054** -0.110***
(0.024) (0.024)
Observations 121,215 131,383
Number of Students 58,755 60,841
Note: Table 2.7 investigates the impact of shootings on students by gender
using student-level data from the California Department of Education. Us-
ing conditional fixed effects logit models with student-level fixed effects, we
study the probability of students reaching level 4 or 5 on math and English
tests. The sample is restricted to students who took tests both before and
after a shooting. Estimates for student and year fixed effects are not shown.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Student-level data from California provided by the California Depart-
ment of Education (CDE).
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Table 2.8: The Effect of Shootings on enrollment for future years
VARIABLES Grade10 Grade11 Total Total
After 1.201 -2.881 3.982 -9.118
(6.251) (9.900) (24.09) (34.38)
After*Shooting School -41.40* -35.92* -130.2* -196.0**
(22.28) (21.81) (75.40) (83.04)
EXCLUDED 1st Yr Y Y Y Y
EXCLUDED 2nd Yr Y Y
Observations 5,173 4,335 5,192 4,345
R-squared 0.437 0.438 0.462 0.468
Note: Table A.1 presents difference-in-differences regression estimates
for the number of students in grades 10 and 11, and the total number of
students, by excluding the first year or the first two years after a shoot-
ing. The coefficient of interest is After*Shooting School. We use clus-
tered standard errors at the district level. Coefficients for school and
year fixed effects are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Common Core of Data (CCD) from the National Center for Ed-
ucation Statistics (NCES).
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Table 2.9: The Effect of Homicidal Shootings on Test Results - Matching
Estimates
(1) (2)
Fraction Proficient in
Math English
Kernel -10.17*** -8.43***
(2.47) (2.40)
Caliper -10.75*** -9.17***
(2.48) (2.41)
Nearest Neighbor -7.79*** -5.15*
(3.58) (3.13)
Note: Table 2.9 presents matching regression estimates for math and En-
glish proficiency rate. Matching regressions are based on state, area (city,
suburb, town or rural), size of school and number of teachers. Table 2.9
presents three type of matching estimates: Kernel, Caliper and Nearest
Neighbor. The reported coefficient is the variable of interest: the shooting
variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Test results and other variables are extracted from each school’s
report card and from data files posted by each state’s Department of Ed-
ucation.
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Chapter 3
Ill Communication: Mobile
Phones & Student Performance
Authors: Louis-Philippe Béland and Richard Murphy
3.1 Introduction
Technological advancements are commonly viewed leading to increased pro-
ductivity. Numerous studies document the benefits of technology on produc-
tivity in the workplace (Aral et al. (2007), Ding et al. (2009) and Chakraborty
and Kazarosian (1999)) and on human capital (Malamud and Pop-Eleches
(2011)). There are, however, potential drawbacks to new technologies, when
they can be used for multiple purposes. Then they may provide distractions,
and reduce productivity, such as is the case with teenagers and mobile phones
at school.
Mobile phones can be a source of great distraction in the classroom, as
they provide students with access to chat software, texting, games, social
media and the Internet. Given these features, a mobile phone can be a great
temptation to the teenage mind during lessons.
A large majority of teenagers use mobile phones. In the United States,
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72% of teens owned a mobile phone in 2012, while in England, the proportion
was 90.3.%1 There is a debate in both countries as to how schools should
address the issue of mobile phones. Some advocate for a complete ban, while
others promote the use of mobile phones as a teaching tool in classrooms
(eg. Barkham and Moss (2012), Drury (2012), O’Toole (2011), Johnson
(2012) and Carroll (2013)). Schools differ on how they have reacted to this
phenomenon, with some applying strict bans and others allowing their usage.
Despite their prevalence, the consequences of mobile phones for high school
student performance has not been studied to date.
In this paper, we estimate the effect of implementing a mobile phone
ban on student test scores. We generate a unique dataset on mobile phone
policies from a survey of high schools in four cities in England (Birmingham,
Leicester, London and Manchester), which we combine with administrative
data from U.K. school performance tables and the National Pupil Database.
We use differences in mobile phone policies and differences in the timing
of the implementation of these policies to measure the impact on student
performance, first at the school level, then at the student level. The nature
of the National Pupil Database allows us to study the impact of mobile
phones on different types of high-school students: by gender, race and their
prior achievement in elementary school at age 11.
Our results indicate that there is an improvement in school and student
performance after introducing a mobile phone ban. We find no significant
impact on mobile phone bans that are not widely complied with and that the
impact of banning of mobile phones improves the outcomes of low-achieving
students the most. Thus, our results suggest that banning mobile phones
from school premises reduces educational inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses mobile
phone use in England; Section 3 provides a description of the data, survey
and descriptive statistics; Section 4 presents the methodology; Section 5 is
1According to eMarketer (2012).
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devoted to results; and Section 6 concludes with policy implications.
3.2 Mobile Phones in England
Mobile phones are ubiquitous in England; 94% of adults and 90.3% of teenagers
owned a mobile phone in 2012.2 Figure 1 shows the percentage of teenagers
and adults who owned a mobile phone in England, from 2000 to 2011, and
shows a steady increase in mobile phone ownership, from 60% in 2000 to 94%
in 2012. Teenagers and adults had similar ownership rates over this period.3
In addition to ownership, the usage of mobile phones changed drastically
between 2000 to 2011. The primary use of mobile phones has evolved from
calls and text messages to, in recent years, the Internet and social network-
ing. This change was brought about with the introduction of smartphones
between 2004 and 2007. In 2004, prior to their introduction 60% had a mobile
phone, but the number of texts sent per day was 1-2 on average, with limited
Internet usage. In contrast, in 2007, more than 70% had mobile phones, and
the average mobile phone owner sent more than five texts per day4. Internet
usage on mobile phones has increased drastically, as many games and ap-
plications have emerged on smartphones in recent years. Over a quarter of
adults and almost half of teenagers in England owned a smartphone in 2012,
with estimates that by 2017, 96% of teenagers will have a smartphone.5
2According to MobilePhone operators (2012) and eMarketer (2012), respectively.
3According to reports by Ofcom (2011).
4According to reports by Ofcom communication market reports (2012).
5According to reports by Ofcom communication market reports (2012) and eMarketers
(2012), respectively.
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3.3 Data and survey
3.3.1 Mobile phone policies
The U.K. Department of Education does not have any official policy or rec-
ommendation regarding mobile phone usage in schools. Therefore, schools
are free to decide how to regulate their use on school property, which means
there is a variation in how mobile phones are treated.
In the spring of 2013, we conducted a survey of high schools’ mobile
phone policies in four cities in England (Birmingham, Leicester, London and
Manchester). We emailed every high school in each of the four cities with
a set of questions on their mobile phone policies. The survey had questions
about the current policy toward mobile phones, when it was implemented,
whether there was a previous mobile phone policy and, if so, when it was
implemented. This was complemented by questions relating to punishments
for violating the policy and how well complied with answered by the head-
teacher (equivalent to a principal) considered the policy to be. In addition
to questions relating to mobile phone policy, we also asked if there were any
other policy or leadership changes occurring over the same time period,to
account for any general shifts in educational policy at the school6.
We received complete answers from 90 schools, which represents nearly
20% of the high schools in the four cities in our sample. Table 3.1 presents
statistics on when mobile phone policies were put into effect and the type of
policy introduced (a ban with a high level of compliance vs. low-compliance
ban). It shows that many schools implemented a mobile phone ban between
2004 and 2010, and that most of the bans are widely complied with.
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics for key variables for the whole
sample and pre- and post-policy by ban type. It shows that permanent stu-
6The school could either reply to our email directly, or visit a website to respond to
our survey. The survey website is http://mobilephoneatschool.weebly.com. We sent up to
three emails if we did not receive an answer. Finally, if we did not hear back from schools
from our emails, a research assistant called the schools to gather survey responses orally.
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dent characteristics are similar pre- and post-ban, implying there is minimal
sorting by parents according to mobile phone policy. It also indicates an
increase in standardized test scores at age 16 after the introduction of the
policy. Table 3.9 presents summary statistics on the schools that responded
to our mobile phone survey and schools that refused to answer or did not
provide complete information on their school mobile policy. Schools that
responded and schools that did not provide a complete response are simi-
lar along a number of dimensions (proportion of Special Educational Needs
(SEN) students, average test scores (GCSE) and number of pupils), though
schools that answered our survey have a statistically higher proportion of
SEN students.
We also categorize mobile phone restrictions into high-compliance bans
and low-compliance bans, based on the head teacher’s assessment of how
widely the policy is being adhered to. Once a school implements a mobile
phone ban, we observe very few changes to the policy over time.
3.3.2 Student Performance
All students in England’s publicly funded schools follow the National Cur-
riculum. They progress through a series of five “Key Stages.” Our paper
focuses on secondary school students. Students start secondary school at
age 11 after completing Key Stage 2 in primary school. Key Stage 3 covers
the first three years of secondary school and Key Stage 4 leads to subject-
specific exams at age 16, called a General Certificate of Secondary Education
(GCSE).
U.K. Performance Table — School-level data
We use the school performance tables published by the U.K. government in
November of each year. The performance tables detail the achievement of
each school’s pupils in the most recent national externally marked exams.
71
The key measure is the proportion of students achieving a grade of A*-C on
at least five GCSEs, which is often seen as the basic benchmark of attainment
by employers and academic institutions.
National Pupil Database — Student-level data
The National Pupil Database (NPD) is a rich education dataset of the com-
plete state school population of England. It contains information on student
performance as well as student characteristics (gender, age, race, ethnicity,
whether they are eligible for the Free School Meals (FSM), and whether they
are a Special Educational Needs (SEN) student). From this additional school
features can be derived such as the percentage of students with particular
characteristics.
The measure of student achievement that we use is the standardized score
of a student at Key Stage 4. This score gives us more information than the
dichotomous variable: whether or not the student earned at least a C on
five GCSEs. We also use an alternative measure of student performance as
an outcome variable, which reflects the differences in difficulty in attaining
certain grades and student performance at Key Stage 3. These test scores
are standardized by year to account for any potential grade inflation.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 School-level data
To estimate the impact of a mobile phone ban, we use the difference in timing
for the introduction of the policy, using high schools in our sample that had
not yet imposed a ban as our comparison group. Equation (1) represents our
main specification.
Yst = β0 + β1MobileBanOnst + β2Xst + µs + γt + st (3.1)
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where Yst is the outcome variable of interest, the percentage of students that
achieve at least a C on five GCSEs, for school s in year t; Xst are controls
for school characteristics (total pupils and the proportion of Key Stage 4
pupils with SEN). The variable of interest is MobileBanOnst, which takes a
value of one for every year after the implementation of the mobile ban. It
captures the impact of the introduction of the mobile phone ban on student
performance. Accordingly, the coefficient of interest is β1 which represents
that increase in the proportion of students attaining 5 A-C GCSE at school
s. We include school fixed effects, µs, for school s, to control for any time-
invariant school-level factors that may be correlated with outcome variables.
We also include year fixed effects, γt, to control for any trends in student
attainment from 2002 to 2012.
A potential threat to the study’s validity arises if other policies were
implemented at the same time as a mobile phone ban. To address this, we
use information on whether any leadership or policy changes occurred during
the period of analysis. Therefore, in the most demanding specifications, we
control for such changes. This is open to recall bias, but we would expect that
head teachers would be very familiar with school-level policies and leadership
changes.
3.4.2 Student-level data
We use a similar empirical strategy for student-level data as for school-level
data, but now we can exploit the panel aspect of the data at the student level
as well as conditioning on individual characteristics. In the specifications
that control for prior test score we are accounting for individual ability and
all inputs up until age 11 and therefore the coefficients can be interpreted
as growth terms between age 11 and age 16. Moreover as we are allowing
for school effects the variation that we are using is within school, i.e. did
students in school s have significantly higher learning growth after a ban
was introduced. Again the primary outcome variable of interest is student
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performance at age 16, but now β1 represents the standard deviation gains
in test score due to a mobile phone ban. We use interaction terms to study
the impact of the mobile ban on students with different characteristics: SEN
students, FSM students, males, minority groups and achievement level at
age 11. Results using the achievement level at age 14 are very similar to our
main findings, but with a smaller sample size.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 School-level data
Table 3.3 presents regression results for the fraction of students achieving at
least a C on five GCSEs, which represents school performance. There is a
substantial increase in the fraction of students attaining the five-C benchmark
after the introduction of a mobile phone ban. Estimates of our preferred
specification, column (4) in the table, show an increases of 3.64% points
after the introduction, significant at the 1% level. Table 3.3 indicates that
a higher proportion of students achieve at least a C on five GCSEs after a
mobile phone ban is imposed. Results are robust across specifications.
Table 3.4 investigates heterogeneity of the mobile phone ban. It separates
bans into high-compliance bans and low-compliance bans using the head
teacher’s assessment of the degree to which the ban is complied with.7 In
Table 3.4, we examine whether high-compliance mobile phone bans have
a more positive impact on student performance than low-compliance bans.
Table 3.4 indicates that only high-compliance bans have a significant impact
on the proportion of students achieving at least a C on five GCSEs. The
coefficient associated with the low-compliance variable is positive but not
significant. Estimates from our preferred specification, column (4) in the
table, show an increases of 3.88% after the introduction of an high-compliance
7We define high-compliance bans as those with a score from the head teacher of 4 or
higher out of 7.
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mobile ban, significant at the 1% level.
3.5.2 Student-level data
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present estimates of the impact of a mobile phone ban on
individual student performance.
Table 3.5 presents the impact of imposing a mobile phone ban on student
performance, controlling for student characteristics (achievement at age 11,
gender, SEN students and FSM students). Results of our preferred specifi-
cation (4) show an improvement in student performance after a school bans
mobile phones of 6.09%, significant at the 5% level. Results are robust across
specifications.
In Table 3.6, we examine whether high-compliance mobile bans have a
more positive impact on student performance than low-compliance mobile
bans. As in the aggregate data, we find that only high-compliance mobile
bans have a positive and significant impact on student achievement (7.45%).
The coefficient associated with a low-compliance mobile ban is positive but
not significant.
Table 3.7 studies the heterogeneity of a ban on students with different
characteristics, using interaction terms for SEN students, FSM students,
males and minority groups. This is in addition to any baseline effects. The
results indicate that a mobile phone ban has a positive and significant im-
pact on FSM-eligible students (column (1)), SEN students (column (2)) and
males (column (3)). In columns (1), (2) and (3) the baseline effect of a mobile
phone ban is not significant when controlling for student characteristics and
ban interaction, which indicates that results are driven by a part of the distri-
bution and that not all students are positively affected by mobile phone bans.
Table 3.7 also investigates whether mobile phone bans have different effects
on high-achieving students than they do on low-achieving students (columns
(5), (6) and (7)), using an interaction term between mobile phone bans and
test scores at age 11. The interaction term is negative and significant, which
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indicates that the ban is more effective for low-achieving students.
Table 3.8 studies in more detail the impact of the ban on students with
different achievement levels at age 11. Students are grouped into five cate-
gories based on their achievement level at age 11, where group 1 means lowest
achievement group and group 5 is the highest achievement group. Tables 3.8
shows that the ban has a positive and significant impact on low-achieving
students and no significant impact on high-achieving students.8 Figure 3.2
shows the density of standardized student test scores before and after a mo-
bile phone ban. It shows that the density of test scores shifts right after the
imposition of a ban.
3.6 Robustness
We do several tests to ensure that our results are robust and valid.
One possible concern is the potential for pre-existing trends that could po-
tentially affect the mobile phone ban impact presented in this paper. Figure
3.3 presents the event study graph for student achievement before and after
the implementation of a mobile phone ban. It shows no pre-existing trends
before the implementation of a ban and an increase in achievement after
schools ban mobile phones. The figure provides confidence that pre-existing
trends are not a concern.
Another potential concern is that students might sort into schools based
on the mobile phone policy in place. We can test for this by using student
characteristics as outcome variables and investigate if the variable Mobile
Ban is significant. Table 3.10 shows that the variable Mobile Ban is never
significant for test scores at age 11, males, minorities, SEN students and FSM
students. This suggests that students are not sorting into schools based on
the mobile phone policy in place.
We also consider the period post-2005 differently. During that period,
8Results using achievement at age 14 instead of age 11 are similar
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smartphones became very popular and mobile phones became more of an
issue for schools. Results of Table 3.11 once again show a positive impact of
banning mobile phones on the period 2005 to 2011.
Another related test is to only use students in schools that imposed a ban
between Key Stage 3 (with a test at age 14) and Key Stage 4 (with a test at
age 16), for which we have fewer observations but for which sorting is not an
issue. Tables 3.12 and 3.13 show very similar results to our main findings.
This provides confidence that the increase in student performance after the
implementation of a mobile phone ban is indeed caused by the ban.
The National Pupil Database contains several measures of student at-
tainment. We use several outcome measures of student performance, such as
GCSE and an alternate point-scoring system that reflects the differences in
difficulty in attaining certain grades, in addition to the standardized score of
a student at Key Stage 4. Results presented in Tables 3.14, 3.15, 3.16 and
3.17 are very similar to our main findings. Moreover, using standardized test
scores at age 14 as the outcome variable once again leads to similar results
to using test scores at age 16, though the coefficients are smaller and not all
specifications are significant. Results are available in Table 3.18.
Overall, results are very robust to alternative specifications and a rich
set of time-varying state characteristics. These numerous robustness checks
provide confidence that mobile phone bans play a role in determining school
and student performance.
3.7 Conclusion
We estimate the effect of mobile phone bans on student performance. We
combine survey data on mobile phone policies for schools in four cities with
administrative data from the U.K. school performance table and the National
Pupil Database. We use differences in mobile phone policies and differences
in the timing of the implementation of the policy to measure the impact on
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student performance, first at the school level, then at the student level.
Our results indicate that there is an increase in school and student per-
formance after introducing a mobile phone ban. We find that banning mobile
phones improves the outcomes of the low-achieving students the most and
has no significant impact on high achievers. The results suggest that low-
achieving students are more likely to be distracted by the presence of mobile
phones, while high achievers can focus in the classroom regardless of the mo-
bile phone policy. Our results suggest that mobile phones create a distraction
from learning and that introducing a ban limits this problem. Our results
also suggest than banning mobile phones can reduce educational inequality.
While technology improves the standard of living for many, our findings
suggest at least one negative impact of technology on productivity. Further
research should be done to better understand the potential negative impact
of new technology on productivity in the workplace and in schools.
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Figure 3.1: Mobile Phones Take-up Rates in England
Source: Oftel/ Ofcom, Based on face to face survey data, 2011
Figure 3.2: KS4 density pre and post ban
Source: National Pupil database
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Figure 3.3: Event study graph for student proficiency and mobile ban
Source: UK School Performance Table
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics on Mobile Phone policies in effect per year
Year High-compliance Ban low-compliance Ban Mobile Ban
2000 0 0 0
2001 0 0 0
2002 2 1 3
2003 5 1 6
2004 7 2 9
2005 13 6 19
2006 20 9 29
2007 31 12 43
2008 38 20 58
2009 47 24 71
2010 54 31 85
2011 55 33 88
2012 56 34 90
Source: Mobile phone policy survey of schools in four cities in England: Birmingham,
Leicester, London and Manchester
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics on key variables Pre and Post policy
Student Characteristics Sampled Pre-Policy Post-Policy Difference
Test Scores - Age 16 (Kk4tot) 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.06
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.04)
Test Scores - Age 11 (Kk2tot) 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.04)
Male 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.00
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.02)
Minority 0.59 0.55 0.63 0.08
(0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.03)
SEN 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.05
(0.39) (0.36) (0.40) (0.01)
FSM 0.31 0.28 0.35 0.07
(0.46 ) (0.45) (0.48) (0.02)
Total Students 130,659 62,273 65,097
Total School * Years 817 404 394
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics on key variable Pre and Post policy. SEN means
Special Educational needs student and FSM means Free School Meal students.
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.3: The Effect of Mobile Phone ban on school performance - using
UK School Performance Table
School Performance- GCSE (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mobile Ban 4.48*** 4.42*** 3.65*** 3.64***
(1.24) (1.22) (1.16) (1.14)
School characteristics
Time invariant yes no no no
Time variant yes no yes yes
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
School fixed effect no yes yes yes
Leadership changes no no no yes
Schools 90 90 90 90
Observations 907 907 907 907
Note: Table 3.3 presents regression estimates for proportion of student who pass
the GCSE test. We use robust clustered standard error at the school level. The
time variant controls are number of pupils enrolled at school and proportion of
KS4 pupils with Special Educational Needs (SEN). Time invariant controls are
dummy for city and type of schools (boys, girls or mixed). The leadership changes
variable control if there was a leadership or policy changes occuring at the time of
the introduction of the policy. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: UK Performance Table and Mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.4: The Effect of Mobile Phone ban on school performance by ban
efficiency - using UK School Performance Table
School Performance- GCSE (1) (2) (3) (4)
High-compliance Mobile Ban 3.95*** 4.94*** 3.95*** 3.88***
(1.54) (1.62) (1.54) (1.50)
Low-compliance Mobile Ban 1.83 2.37 1.83 1.82
(1.82) (2.06) (1.82) (1.81)
School characteristics
Time invariant yes no no no
Time variant yes no yes yes
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
School fixed effect no yes yes yes
Leadership changes no no no yes
Schools 90 90 90 90
Observations 907 907 907 907
Note: Table 3.4 presents regression estimates for proportion of student who pass
the GCSE test. It separates ban into high-compliance (principal assesment score
above or eqal to 4 out of 7) and low-compliance mobile ban. We use robust clustered
standard error at the school level. The time variant controls are number of pupils
enrolled at school and proportion of KS4 pupils with Special Educational Needs
(SEN). Time invariant controls are dummy for city and type of schools (boys, girls
or mixed). The leadership changes variable control if there was a leadership or pol-
icy changes occuring at the time of the introduction of the policy. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: UK Performance Table and Mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.5: The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance - Using the NPD
Std Student Performance - age 16 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mobile Ban 5.93** 6.35** 6.70** 6.09** 5.06*
(2.91) (2.91) (2.94) (2.92) (2.86)
School & student characteristics
Kk2tot no yes yes yes yes
Male no no yes yes yes
Minority no no yes yes yes
SEN no no yes yes yes
FSM no no yes yes yes
Leadership changes no no no yes yes
School characteristics no no no no yes
Observations 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595
Note:Table 3.5 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable
is standardized test score at age 16. We use robust clustered standard error at the school
level with school and year fixed effect. SEN means Special Educational Needs student
and FSM means Free School Meal students. Test Score- age 11 is standardized student
test score at age 11 (before high school). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.6: The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance by ban efficiency -
Using the NPD
Std Student Performance - age 16 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High-compliance Mobile Ban 6.42** 6.81** 7.12** 7.45** 6.60**
(3.00) (2.99) (3.03) (3.04) (2.96)
Low-compliance Mobile Ban 2.12 2.67 3.42 5.87 8.60
(6.58) (6.53) (6.56) (5.29) (5.40)
School & student characteristics
Kk2tot no yes yes yes yes
Male no no yes yes yes
Minority no no yes yes yes
SEN no no yes yes yes
FSM no no yes yes yes
Leadership changes no no no yes yes
School characteristics no no no no yes
Observations 130,659 130,659 130,659 130,659 130,659
Note:Table 3.6 presents regression estimates for student performance. It separates ban
into high-compliance (principal assesment score above or eqal to 4 out of 7) and low-
compliance mobile ban. Outcome variable is standardized test score at age 16. We use
robust clustered standard error at the school level with school and year fixed effect. SEN
means Special Educational Needs student and FSM means Free School Meal students.
Kk2tot is standardized student test score at age 11 (before high school). *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.7: The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance by student characteristics -
Using the NPD
Std Student Performance - age 16 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mobile Ban 3.98 4.26 4.17 8.96*** 5.87** 4.49 3.61
(2.98) (2.99) (2.95) (3.43) (2.91) (2.96) (3.02)
Mobile Ban * FSM 7.37*** 4.88** 4.63**
(2.02) (1.94) (1.93)
Mobile Ban * SEN 10.89*** 5.85**
(2.36) (2.39)
Mobile Ban * male 4.13**
(2.10)
Mobile Ban * minority -4.90*
(2.63)
Mobile Ban * Kk2tot -5.89***-5.42***-4.65***
(1.05) (1.02) (1.06)
School & student characteristics
Kk2tot yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Male yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
SEN yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
FSM yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
minority yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Leadership changes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 130,595 130,595 130,595130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595
Note: Table 3.7 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is stan-
dardized test score in student 8 best subject. We use robust clustered standard error at the school
level with school and year fixed effect. SEN means Special Educational Needs student and FSM
means Free School Meal students. Kk2tot represents standardized test score at age 11. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.8: The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance with
preachievement group - Using the NPD
Std Student Performance - age 16 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mobile Ban * Kk2tot - 1 13.29*** 14.40*** 13.68*** 12.36***
(3.11) (3.14) (3.13) (3.05)
Mobile Ban * Kk2tot - 2 8.59*** 9.94*** 9.30*** 8.02***
(3.07) (3.11) (3.08) (3.05)
Mobile Ban * Kk2tot - 3 5.78* 6.72** 6.22** 4.97
(3.12) (3.15) (3.13) (3.07)
Mobile Ban * Kk2tot - 4 2.98 2.68 2.14 1.06
(3.15) (3.18) (3.16) (3.11)
Mobile Ban * Kk2tot - 5 -0.82 -1.97 -2.63 -2.70
(3.42) (3.47) (3.49) (3.38)
School & student characteristics
Kk2tot categorical yes yes yes yes
Male no yes yes yes
Minority no yes yes yes
SEN no yes yes yes
FSM no yes yes yes
Leadership changes no no yes yes
School characteristics no no no yes
Observations 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595
Note: Table 3.8 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome
variable is standardized test score in student 8 best subject. We use robust clustered
standard error at the school level with school and year fixed effect. SEN means Spe-
cial Educational Needs student and FSM means Free School Meal students. Kk2tot
represents standardized test score at age 11. In this table, student performance at
age 11 (Kk2tot) are grouped in 5 category based on their achievement level at age
11, where group 1 means lowest achivement group and group 5 are highest achieve-
ment group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.9: Descriptive statistics for key variables for schools in sample
and not in sample
Variable In sample Not in sample
Total Pupil 971.34 938.38
(9.14) (24.02)
Proportion SEN students 9.75 7.92
(0.32) (0.13)
School Performance - GCSE 59.51 60.34
(0.65) (0.33)
Note: Table 3.9 Descriptive statistics. Schools in our sample are similar to
schools not in sample for those variables: Total Pupil, Proportion of Specifal
Educational Needs (SEN) students, Student Performance using the GCSE
measure. Using t-test, only the proportion of SEN students is significantly
different between the two samples.
Source: UK Performance Table and mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.10: Balancing test- Using the NPD
Variables Kk2tot Male Minority SEN FSM
Mobile Ban -0.74 -0.39 0.01 0.81 1.07
(1.25) (0.44) (0.72) (1.00) (0.70)
Note: Table 3.10 presents regression estimates for different outcome variables
to investigates if schools that impose a ban are different and if students are
sorting into schools based on student characteristics. SEN means fraction of
Special Educational Needs student, FSM means fraction Free School Meal stu-
dents. Kk2tot means standardized average test score at age 11 of the school.
Male and Minority are fraction of students that are male and from a minority
group respectively. We use robust clustered standard error at the school level
with school and year fixed effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.11: The Effect of Mobile Phone ban assessment on student per-
formance after 2005 - using UK School Performance Table
School Performance- GCSE (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mobile Ban 3.84*** 3.67** 3.19** 3.18**
(1.44) (1.49) (1.48) (1.48)
School characteristics
Time invariant yes no no no
Time variant yes no yes yes
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
School fixed effect no yes yes yes
Leadership changes no no no yes
Schools 90 90 90 90
Observations 585 585 585 585
Note: Table 3.11 presents regression estimates for proportion of student who
pass the GCSE test from 2005 to 2011. We use robust clustered standard error
at the school level. The time variant controls are number of pupils enrolled at
school and proportion of KS4 pupils with Special Educational Needs (SEN).
Time invariant controls are dummy for city and type of schools (boys, girls
or mixed). The leadership changes variable control if there was a leadership
or policy changes occuring at the time of the introduction of the policy. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: UK Performance Table and Mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.12: The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance - Using the
NPD
Std Student Performance - age 16 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mobile Ban 6.86** 5.51** 6.14** 6.38** 5.30**
(2.71) (2.59) (2.60) (2.64) (2.67)
School & student characteristics
Kk3tot no yes yes yes yes
Male no no yes yes yes
Minority no no yes yes yes
SEN no no yes yes yes
FSM no no yes yes yes
Leadership changes no no no yes yes
School characteristics no no no no yes
Observations 83,211 83,211 83,211 83,211 83,211
Note: Table 3.12 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome
variable is standardized test score at age 16 and control for standardized test score
at age 14. We use robust clustered standard error at the school level with school
and year fixed effect. SEN means Special Educational Needs student and FSM
means Free School Meal students. Kk3tot means standardized test score at age
14. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.13: The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance with preachievement
group - Using the NPD
Std Student Performance - age 16 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mobile Ban * Kk3tot - 1 10.43*** 11.21*** 11.39*** 11.39*** 10.06***
(3.05) (3.02) (3.04) (3.04) (3.03)
Mobile Ban * Kk3tot - 2 9.28*** 10.58*** 10.79*** 10.79*** 9.64***
(3.11) (3.08) (3.12) (3.12) (3.16)
Mobile Ban * Kk3tot - 3 5.53* 6.21** 6.44** 6.44** 5.20*
(3.05) (3.08) (3.13) (3.13) (3.13)
Mobile Ban * Kk3tot - 4 2.49 2.67 2.91 2.91 1.75
(3.09) (3.09) (3.13) (3.13) (3.14)
Mobile Ban * Kk3tot - 5 -0.22 0.39 0.68 0.69 -0.07
(3.42) (3.47) (3.49) (3.49) (3.49)
School & student characteristics
Kk3tot categorical yes yes yes yes yes
Male no yes yes yes yes
Minority no yes yes yes yes
SEN no yes yes yes yes
FSM no yes yes yes yes
Leadership changes no no yes yes yes
School characteristics no no no yes yes
Observations 83,211 83,211 83,211 83,211 83,211
Note: Table 3.13 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is
standardized test score. We use robust clustered standard error at the school level with school
and year fixed effect. SEN means Special Educational Needs student and FSM means Free
School Meal students. Kk3tot represents test score at age 14. In this table, results are grouped
in 5 category based on their achievement level (Kk3tot) at age 14, where group 1 means lowest
achivement group and group 5 are highest achievement group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.14: The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance - Using the NPD
Std Student Performance - age 16 - alt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mobile Ban 5.57** 6.01** 6.33** 5.77** 4.81*
(2.69) (2.68) (2.71) (2.69) (2.63)
School & student characteristics
Kk2tot no yes yes yes yes
Male no no yes yes yes
Minority no no yes yes yes
SEN no no yes yes yes
FSM no no yes yes yes
Leadership changes no no no yes yes
School characteristics no no no no yes
Observations 130,659 130,659 130,659 130,659 130,659
Note:Table 3.14 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is
standardized test score at age 16. We use robust clustered standard error at the school level
with school and year fixed effect. SEN means Special Educational Needs student and FSM
means Free School Meal students. Kk2tot means test score at age 11. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.15: The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance by student characteristics -
Using the NPD
Std Student Performance - age 16 - alt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mobile Ban 3.82 4.40 4.20 8.33*** 5.58** 4.27 3.75
(2.74) (2.76) (2.74) (3.11) (2.68) (2.72) (2.78)
Mobile Ban * FSM 6.80*** 4.61*** 4.46**
(1.86) (1.78) (1.78)
Mobile Ban * SEN 8.13*** 3.44
(2.10) (2.15)
Mobile Ban * male 3.37*
(1.95)
Mobile Ban * minority -4.37*
(2.43)
Mobile Ban * Kk2tot -5.21***-4.76***-4.31***
(0.99) (0.96) (1.01)
School & student characteristics
Kk2tot yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Male yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
SEN yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
FSM yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
minority yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Leadership changes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 130,659130,659130,659130,659 130,659 130,659 130,659
Note: Table 3.15 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is stan-
dardized test at age 16. We use robust clustered standard error at the school level with school and
year fixed effect. SEN means Special Educational Needs student and FSM means Free School Meal
students. Kk2tot means standardized test score at age 11. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.16: The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance with preachievement group
- Using the NPD
Std Student Performance - age 16 - alt (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mobile Ban * Kk2tot - 1 11.05*** 12.11*** 11.44*** 10.22***
(2.85) (2.88) (2.86) (2.79)
Mobile Ban * Kk2tot - 2 9.03*** 10.30*** 9.72*** 8.53***
(2.84) (2.87) (2.84) (2.81)
Mobile Ban * Kk2tot - 3 6.00** 6.89** 6.44** 5.27*
(2.90) (2.92) (2.91) (2.86)
Mobile Ban * Kk2tot - 4 2.86 2.56 2.06 1.05
(2.94) (2.96) (2.94) (2.90)
Mobile Ban * Kk2tot - 5 -0.78 -1.87 -2.47 -2.57
(3.21) (3.25) (3.27) (3.18)
School & student characteristics
Kk2tot categorical yes yes yes yes
Male no yes yes yes
Minority no yes yes yes
SEN no yes yes yes
FSM no yes yes yes
Leadership changes no no yes yes
School characteristics no no no yes
Observations 130,659 130,659 130,659 130,659
Note: Table 3.16 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is stan-
dardized test score in student 8 best subject. We use robust clustered standard error at the school
level with school and year fixed effect. SEN means Special Educational Needs student and FSM
means Free School Meal students. Kk2tot represents test score at age 11. In this table, results
are grouped in 5 category based on their achievement level at age 11, where group 1 means lowest
achivement group and group 5 are highest achievement group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.17: The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance GCSE-EM - Using
the NPD
Student Performance age 16 - GCSE - EM (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mobile Ban 1.98** 2.24** 2.23** 1.92**
(0.93) (0.91) (0.92) (0.89)
School & student characteristics
Kk2tot no yes yes yes
Male no no yes yes
SEN no no yes yes
FSM no no yes yes
Leadership changes no no yes yes
School characteristics no no no yes
Observations 130,659 130,659 130,659 130,659
Note: Table 3.17 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome vari-
able is passing GCSE - EM. We use robust clustered standard error at the school level
with school and year fixed effect. SEN means Special Educational Needs student and
FSM means Free School Meal students. Kk2tot means test score at age 11. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey.
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Table 3.18: The Effect of Mobile Policy on student performance at age 14 - Using
the NPD
Std Student Performance - age 14 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mobile Ban 0.99 1.59 2.53* 2.98* 2.34
(1.77) (1.49) (1.50) (1.54) (1.53)
School & student characteristics
Kk2tot no yes yes yes yes
Male no no yes yes yes
Minority no no yes yes yes
SEN no no yes yes yes
FSM no no yes yes yes
Leadership changes no no no yes yes
School characteristics no no no no yes
Observations 112,339 112,339 112,339 112,339 112,339
Note:Table 3.18 presents regression estimates for student performance at age 14. Out-
come variable is standardized test score at age 14. We use robust clustered standard er-
ror at the school level with school and year fixed effect. SEN means Special Educational
Needs student and FSM means Free School Meal students. Kk2tot means standardized
test score at age 11. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey.
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General Conclusion
In this thesis, I answer three important questions in public and labor eco-
nomics. In Chapter 1, I investigate whether party allegiance (Democrat vs.
Republican) of governors has an impact on the labor market outcomes. I
document a strong impact from Democrat governors, especially for black
workers. They work more and more hours under Democratic administra-
tions and there is a decrease in the black-white wage gap. In Chapter 2, I
analyze how shootings in high schools affect schools and students. Chapter 2
shows that homicidal shootings significantly decrease the enrollment of stu-
dents in Grade 9, and substantially decrease test scores in math and English.
It also demonstrates the lack of a statistically significant effect from suicidal
shootings on all outcome variables of interest. Using student-level data from
California, we confirm that part of the effects on student performance occur
as a result of students remaining enrolled and not solely through a composi-
tion effect. My third chapter investigates the impact of school mobile phone
policy on student performance. Combining a unique dataset on autonomous
mobile phone policies from a survey of schools in four cities in England with
administrative data, I investigate the impact of introducing a mobile phone
ban on student performance. The results indicate that there is an increase
in student performance after a school bans the use of mobile phones. This
suggests that mobile phones cause distraction from learning and introducing
a ban limits this problem.
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